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ABSTRACT
This thesis is a study of the Community Relations Department of the Southern 
Organizing Committee of the Congress of Industrial Organizations during the CIO’s 
Southern Organizing Drive, often referred to as “Operation Dixie.”  The Community 
Relations Department was primarily interested in improving relations between organized 
labor and organized religion, in the hopes that improved church-labor relations would 
produce a situation more conducive to labor organizing, and reduce attacks on the CIO from 
religious leaders.  This thesis examines the methods utilized by the CRD to achieve this end, 
and presents an analysis both of their efficacy and of their implementation.  Specific 
programs that are explored are the CRD’s compilation, and publication, of various religiously 
themed pamphlets, the formation of Religion and Labor Fellowship groups, and the CRD’s 
relations with various anti-labor newspapers that made use of religious arguments to attack 
the CIO and Operation Dixie.  
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1Chapter 1: Introduction
Nearly sixty years ago, the Congress of Industrial Organizations launched the largest 
organizing drive in the history of the South.  This organizing campaign, directed by the 
Southern Organizing Committee (SOC,) and commonly referred to as “Operation Dixie,” 
lasted from 1946 to 1953, and encompassed organizing efforts in twelve southern states, 
undertaken by as many as two hundred and fifty paid organizers.1  In the more than fifty 
years since the drive came to an end, it has received some scattered attention from historians, 
but surprisingly little, when the historical significance of this pivotal moment in the history 
of industrial unionism is considered.  Only one full-length book chronicling Operation Dixie, 
The Crisis of American Labor, by Barbara Griffith has been produced to date.  In the preface 
to her book, Griffith writes that her “intent is to open up the topic by setting in place the 
broad historical framework, both national and Southern, within which the men and women of 
the CIO and their corporate opponents lived through the daily realities of the struggle.”2 
While Griffith’s work may well have succeeded in “opening up” the topic of Operation 
Dixie, her lead has not been followed in any significant way, and surprisingly little work has 
been published on the subject in the almost twenty years since The Crisis of American Labor 
was published.  This is particularly unfortunate given the rapid pace at which the field of 
Southern labor history has expanded over the last two decades, both in the sheer size of the 
1 Griffith, Barbara, The Crisis of American Labor: Operation Dixie and the Defeat of the CIO, Philadelphia: 
Temple University Press, 1988, p. 26.
2 Ibid, p. xiv.
2field –the number of practitioners, the number of publications, etc – but also in terms of the 
scope of the issues deemed pertinent to the study of the Southern working class.3   
There are many factors at work here, not the least of which is that the CIO, as a 
whole, was a predominantly Northern organization, whose strongest unions were in the 
Northeast and the industrial Midwest.  For historians of the UAW, the UE, or the USWA, 
Operation Dixie, while perhaps of tangential interest, is largely irrelevant.  In the sub-field of 
Southern Labor history, Operation Dixie has fared rather better.  Any history of Southern 
labor in the period after the Second World War, must address the Southern organizing drive 
to some extent.  Even here, however, the drive receives only limited coverage.  Since many 
of these works have tended to be rather specialized case studies dealing with specific union 
locals, or histories of labor in a specific city or state, the coverage given to Operation Dixie 
has, naturally, tended to be rather glancing, limited to how the drive related to the author’s 
particular object of study.  A further complicating factor, perhaps, has to do with the 
emphasis placed, by the organizers of Operation Dixie, on the unionization of the textile 
industry.  Although organizing also took place in other industries, including steel, meat-
packing, and tobacco, the main concern of Operation Dixie was the textile industry.  Textiles 
made up the largest component of Southern industry, and posed the clearest threat to the CIO 
unions of the North, as more and more textile manufacturers relocated their operations to the 
low-wage, non-unionized, South.  The Southern textile industry, even more than Southern 
industry as a whole, has a uniquely depressing history of successive failures when it comes to 
3 For an overview of how the field has developed over the past twenty years, see: Brattain, Michelle, “The 
Pursuits of Post-exceptionalism: Race, Gender, Class, and Politics in the New Southern Labor History,” in 
Eskew, Glenn, ed., Labor in the Modern South, Athens: The University of Georgia Press, 2001. 
3organizing.  While the events of Operation Dixie make a compelling story, they must 
compete with even more monumental failures that occurred in 1919, 1929, and 1934. 
Indeed, one textile historian, Timothy Minchin, has argued that Operation Dixie was not 
nearly as important in the post-war history of Southern textile workers as was the general 
strike of 1951, which, he argues, signaled the effective end of the TWUA’s prospects in the 
South.  Finally, for reasons that are not readily apparent, much of Southern labor history thus 
far, and it should be remembered that the field is a relatively new one, has tended to focus on 
the period prior to the Second World War.       
Whatever the reasons may be, the end result has been rather limited coverage of 
Operation Dixie in the historiography of twentieth-century labor.  However understandable 
this neglect may be, it is most unfortunate.  Operation Dixie represented an opportunity for 
the labor movement of truly enormous proportions.  By the end of the Second World War, 
the CIO was firmly entrenched in Northern industry, and had secured a level of 
respectability, and power, both economic and political, that had never before been achieved 
by a labor confederation.  However these achievements were imperiled by the existence of 
the South as a large region typified by cheap, non-union labor.  The South was also the home 
region for a significant contingent of conservative Democrats, whose fierce opposition to 
organized labor, and political power based on long years of congressional seniority, 
threatened a labor movement whose fortunes had been, by this point, firmly tied to the 
political success of liberal, New Deal Democrats.  The South was thus the exposed flank of 
the labor movement, whose organization could spell the victory, or, if it remained 
4unorganized, threaten the defeat, of the labor movement as a whole.  The advantages to be 
gained by organizing the South were monumental, and so were the consequences of failure. 
The vast potential of the South, and its importance to the future of organized labor were 
recognized by the leaders of the CIO, and it was this recognition that prompted the launching 
of Operation Dixie in May of 1946.  
Operation Dixie was, in many ways, a pivotal event in the organizational life of the 
CIO.  From its beginnings in 1935, the organization had expanded rapidly, scoring success 
after success, and expanding rapidly to include millions of workers within its various 
constituent unions.  Until 1946, this rapid expansion had seemed all but unstoppable, but in 
the post-war years the CIO seemed to have hit head-on against a brick wall.  Many factors 
were at work here: the nation’s political swing to the right, the passage of Taft-Hartley in 
1947, the multitude of state “right to work” laws that began cropping up after the war, and 
even ideological divisions within the CIO itself.  Among these factors, was the failure of the 
CIO’s Southern organizing drive, a failure that would have important long-run effects upon 
the viability of the organization, and indeed, upon the future of the labor movement as a 
whole.  In 1946, the “fragile juggernaut” of the CIO, as Robert Zieger terms it, ran head-on 
into the intransigent wall of Southern society, and the juggernaut stalled out, while the wall 
held firm.4  The failure of the CIO to organize the South during the 1940s held important 
long-term implications for both the CIO and the South.  For the CIO, the South remained a 
low-wage haven for runaway Northern manufacturers who could escape the economic 
4 Zieger, Robert, The CIO 1935-1955, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1995, p. 227.
5demands of the unions by relocating to the South.  For the South, the lack of powerful, 
politically engaged unions, helped to perpetuate a system characterized by concentrated 
economic power, low wages, weak worker protection laws, and conservative politics, a 
system that would not be effectively challenged until the advent of the modern Civil Rights 
Movement.    
Operation Dixie, launched amid high hopes, and expectations of success, was not a 
notably successful organizing drive, and evaluations of the project have varied from the 
purely negative to the highly mixed.  Griffith maintains that the drive was a complete failure, 
and even goes so far as to argue that it effectively ended within a year, despite the fact that it 
remained formally operative through 19535.  Robert Zieger, in his overview of the campaign, 
agrees with Griffith’s assessment, writing of the drive that “by the end of 1946 it had become 
a sideshow.6”  Others have been somewhat more positive, noting that while the drive was 
perhaps a failure in terms of its declared goals, it produced some positive achievements.  For 
example, Operation Dixie did bring many committed activists into the labor movement, and 
provided important learning experiences for future organizers, experiences that would aide 
them in future organizing efforts.  Some of the organizers in Operation Dixie viewed the 
drive as at least a partial success, pointing to the important benefits derived by at least some 
newly-unionized workers who were organized during the drive.7  Finally, Timothy Minchin 
argues that while the CIO failed to bring in many new recruits through its efforts, the climate 
5 Griffith, Crisis of American Labor, p. 161.
6 Zieger, The CIO, p. 228.
7 Minchin, Timothy, What Do We Need A Union For?, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997, 
p. 32.
6produced by Operation Dixie helped to boost wages throughout the region, as many 
employers improved wages and conditions in order to ward off unions.8
Whatever the incidental benefits derived from Operation Dixie, it is clear that, at least 
in terms of the CIO’s initial declared goals for the campaign, nothing less than the 
organization of Southern industry as a whole, it was a failure.  The fact that Operation Dixie 
was a failure does not, however, mean that it is without interest, and indeed quite the 
opposite is true.  In addition to their purely historical interest, organizing drives are of 
interest because of what they can tell us about the efficacy of various tactics utilized by labor 
unions to recruit new members.  In this regard, failed campaigns are often more instructive 
than successful ones.9  A successful organizing drive may succeed for a variety of reasons, 
not all of them having anything to do with the tactics adopted by union organizers.  Many 
times when union elections are successful, it has been because the workers were ready and 
willing to organize, for reasons of their own having to do with local conditions and 
grievances.  In situations such as this, the organizer’s role is simply to make themselves 
available, and guide the workers through the process of forming a union.10  Unsuccessful 
drives, on the other hand, provide the researcher with a better opportunity to study methods 
8 Ibid., p. 65
9 While strikes possess a dynamic distinct from, and somewhat different from, organizing campaigns, there are 
certain similarities.  For examples of studies dealing with failed strikes, see Liston Pope’s Millhands and 
Preachers, dealing with the failed strike at Gastonia, North Carolina in 1929, or the coverage of the general 
strike of 1934 in Like a Family by Jacquelyn Dowd Hall, et al.
10 The classic example would be the explosive growth of the UAW in the aftermath of the Flint sit-down strike 
of 1937.  In the South, a similar situation existed in the months leading up to the 1934 General Textile Strike, in 
which workers, angered by what they perceived to be the implementation of a “stretch-out” in the textile mills, 
formed UTWA locals almost faster than organizers could charter them.  See for example, Waldrep, G.C., 
Southern Workers and the Search for Community, chapter  2.
7and tactics.  Clearly the strategy employed by unsuccessful organizers was ineffective, but 
the researcher is left with the task of explaining why this was so.  
In the case of Operation Dixie, many explanations for its failure have been advanced 
in the years since the drive’s conclusion.  These explanations, indeed, have been almost as 
numerous as the writers who have approached the question.  Some have focused on the 
culture of Southern mill and factory workers, arguing that Southern workers were simply too 
individualistic and backward to join labor unions.11  Others have focused on the role played 
by employer oppression, often with the assistance of local authorities, in keeping workers 
from joining unions, and busting unions if, and when they are formed.12  Another explanation 
focuses on the role of race in alienating Southern workers from the CIO, a body that formally 
supported rights for blacks, and which officially advocated integration (although it should be 
noted that these egalitarian goals were frequently ignored by CIO locals, and not just in the 
South.)13  In addition to race-baiting, the CIO was also frequently attacked by anti-labor 
Southerners for being a supposedly communist-dominated organization, or at the very least, 
an organization infiltrated by communists.14  Indeed, for many Southern critics of the CIO, its 
11 Although not actually dealing with Operation Dixie, this argument is advanced in its classic form by W.J. 
Cash in The Mind of the South.
12 Of all of the factors contributing to the failure of Operation Dixie, this is, arguably, the most significant.  For 
arguments focusing on the role of employer resistance and repression, see Griffith, Crisis of American Labor 
pp. 88-105, Zieger, The CIO, p. 235, and David Burgess, Fighting For Social Justice, Detroit: Wayne State 
University Press, 2000, pp. 73-76.
13 For the role of race in Operation Dixie, see Griffith, pp. 62-87, and Zieger, pp. 234-235, and pp. 239-240.  For 
a discussion of race in labor history and historiography, including a critical appraisal of the CIO’s handling of 
race, see Herbert Hill, “The Problem of Race in American Labor History,” Reviews in American History, vol. 
24, no. 2, 1996, pp. 189-208. 
14 Nelson Lichtenstein, for example, explains the failure of Operation Dixie as the result of an “orgy of red-
baiting and race-baiting” that “stopped the CIO’s postwar organizing campaign, Operation Dixie, dead in its 
tracks and snuffed out the political career of many a regional liberal.” Lichtenstein, Nelson, Walter Reuther:  
The Most Dangerous Man in Detroit, Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1995, p 257.
8racial policy served as proof positive of its communistic nature15.  Southern opponents of 
labor were also quick to point out that the CIO was a Northern organization, and portrayed its 
representatives as “outside agitators,” only interested in Southern workers for their potential 
union dues, and incapable of truly understanding Southern society.16 At the other extreme, 
some historians, most notably Robert Korstad and Nelson Lichtenstein have argued that the 
CIO should have championed racial equality more strongly than it did, arguing that 
Operation Dixie lost an opportunity to build what Korstad has termed “civil-rights unionism” 
in the South.17  Some historians, notably Griffith, have pointed to the fact that the CIO’s 
commitment of manpower and money, large as it was by the standards of the time, were 
clearly insufficient to the mammoth task of organizing the entire South.18  Finally, at least 
one historian, Timothy Minchin, has argued that the economic prosperity that followed the 
Second World War produced a situation in which Southern workers, experiencing rising 
wages and an improved standard of living, simply did not consider union membership 
necessary in order to achieve their economic and consumer goals, and were, indeed, leery of 
joining labor unions, perceiving such an act as a potential threat to their continued 
employment.19
15 As John Egerton has noted, southerners often objected to communism more on the grounds of its stances on 
race and religion, than on the basis of its economic critique of capitalism, which was often either not known, or 
understood.  See Egerton, John, Speak Now Against the Day, p. 171.
16 Much was made, for example, of the fact that officials of the TWUA had last names like Rieve and Baldanzi. 
17 Korstad, Robert and Lichtenstein, Nelson, “Opportunities Found and Lost: Labor, Radicals, and the Early 
Civil Rights Movement,” The Journal of American History, Vol. 75, No. 3, 1988, pp. 786-811.   See also: 
Korstad, Robert Rogers, Civil Rights Unionism: Tobacco Workers and the Struggle for Democracy in the Mid-
Twentieth Century South, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003
18 Griffith, Crisis of American Labor, p. 26.
19 Minchin, What Do We Need A Union For?, p. 48.  While Minchin’s point about rising wage standards 
negatively impacting the perceived need for labor unions is probably correct, the emphasis that he places upon 
workers’ fear of losing material possessions is perhaps overstated.  While it is true that the prospect of losing 
9As with any historical phenomenon, it is difficult to exactly pinpoint causation, and 
the failure of Operation Dixie was almost certainly the result of many of the factors 
mentioned above.  Indeed, this is the conclusion that Griffith ultimately comes to, pointing to 
the role of race, religion, and employer repression, while also arguing that the CIO itself 
contributed to the failure of Operation Dixie by allocating insufficient resources to the drive, 
and seeking to apply “Northern” organizing techniques to a “Southern” situation, where 
alternative methods were needed.20  This last explanation, that the CIO employed tactics 
which, while appropriate in the North, failed to meet the unique circumstances of the South, 
is Griffith’s own unique contribution to the study of Operation Dixie, and will constitute one 
of the subjects which will be explored, and addressed, in the following chapters.  In the 
context of Griffith’s argument, the “northern methods” utilized by the CIO during Operation 
Dixie comprised a strategy of targeting the largest employer in a given industry for initial 
organization.  This had been the tactic pursued by the CIO in their organization of the 
automobile and the steel industries.  By organizing General Motors, the UAW had achieved 
what Griffith terms a “break-through,” after which it became easier to organize workers at 
other companies.  The theory behind this strategy was that once it had been demonstrated that 
the union could succeed at organizing the major company within an industry, workers would 
lose their fears of company reprisal, and be more ready to sign up with a union that was 
clearly on the march.  This formed a sort of domino theory of labor organizing, in which an 
one’s car during the course of a long strike due to inability to make payments probably weighed heavily on the 
minds of many workers, workers prior to the war had joined labor unions and gone on strike, risking their jobs, 
housing, and future prospects of obtaining work in the textile industry.  While a car might be (and was) a prized 
possession, even a symbol of independence, it hardly compares to one’s very livelihood.
20 Griffith, Crisis of American Labor, p. 169.
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initial victory would result in the rapid expansion of the union as workers at smaller firms fell 
into line.  While this seemed to work fairly well in the centralized, oligopolistic industries 
characteristic of the North, it failed miserably when it was attempted in the South textile 
industry, most notably with the Kannapolis campaign to organize Cannon Mills.  Griffith’s 
conclusion is that this effort to apply an organizing model which had been wildly successful 
in the North, to the Southern textile industry demonstrated a fundamental lack of 
understanding on the part of Operation Dixie’s leadership of the nature, and structure, of 
Southern industry.  One of the arguments of the current study will be that this critique may 
also be applied equally well to other parts of Operation Dixie’s program for the South.  
This thesis will also address a subject that has received little in-depth coverage in the 
existing historiography of Southern labor: the role of religion in defeating unionization 
efforts.  While the fact that organized religion has often been hostile to organized labor in the 
South is both well-known, and relatively well-documented, the subject has received little in 
the way of extensive, in-depth analysis.  The antagonism between these two institutions, 
religion and labor, when noted, has often been simply acknowledged as a given, and then 
dismissed.  One of the novel aspects of Operation Dixie was that its organizers, rather than 
simply accepting that they would be opposed by local ministers, actively sought to do 
something about it.  Building on outreach programs that had already been established 
successfully in the North, the CIO attempted to use the Community Relations Department as 
a vehicle to win over the clergy of the South to the side of the union.  The efforts of the CRD, 
then, would seem to constitute a prime example of what Griffith classifies as Northern 
11
methods, applied to a Southern situation.  The fact that this effort, which had been successful 
in the North, failed in the South, seems, at first glance to be confirmation of her critique.  The 
detailed study of the CRD then, provides a useful case study with which to test many of 
Griffith’s conclusions, while at the same time exploring the relationship between religion and 
labor in the South, a subject that is both highly complex, and relatively little studied.  It is, by 
no means, the intention of this paper to argue that religion was the primary factor in the 
failure of Operation Dixie, but it seems clear that the opposition of ministers, churches, and 
evangelists did play some role in persuading workers to stay out of the union.  While Ray 
Marshall is probably correct in arguing that the extent to which religion was important in the 
defeat of the CIO in the South is impossible to determine, it is possible to say that religion 
had a role to play in this defeat, a role that is deserving of further, detailed, study.21  
In a sense, the fact that the CIO was opposed by the religious leaders of the South 
should not be surprising.  The Church, as with other social elites in the South, tended to 
identify with the interests of business when it came to unions.  Church opposition was of a 
piece with the wider antagonism to the CIO expressed by other civic leaders ranging from 
chambers of commerce to newspaper editors, and including prominent doctors, lawyers, and 
private citizens.  The New South vision, which emphasized the importance of industry to the 
emergence of the South as a prosperous and successful region, ready to take its place 
alongside the rest of the nation, viewed growth of industry as absolutely essential, and 
consequently tended to treat labor unions as a potential threat to this new-found economic 
21 Marshall, F. Ray, Labor in the South, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1967. (Sorry, I don’t have 
the exact page number for this citation, as I don’t own a copy of this text, and I haven’t had a chance to check it 
out of the library yet this term.  Will remedy this shortly.)
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prosperity.22  The civic leaders of the South were not prepared to countenance any 
developments that might upset their ability to attract, and retain, industry, and thus tended to 
be hostile when faced with the possibility of the South becoming a union stronghold.  One of 
the principle reasons that the South was appealing to industry was, after all, its tradition of 
cheap, non-union, labor.  Many of the textile factories that had sprung up around the South in 
the first half of the twentieth century were owned by firms that were fleeing the high-wage 
North, where textile unions were most heavily represented.  Should these unions establish a 
presence in the South, it was feared, manufacturers would no longer have an incentive to 
relocate their operations, and the South would lose its competitive advantage in attracting 
industry.  Church leaders who, along with other local elites, tended to share in this vision of 
civic boosterism, and who viewed their role in terms of promoting the fortunes of the 
community as a whole, were predisposed to be hostile to the CIO.  Moreover, as Liston Pope 
has demonstrated in his classic account of the Gastonia strike of 1929, Millhands and 
Preachers, many ministers in industrial towns enjoyed a lucrative patronage relationship with 
local manufacturers, a situation that would tend to mitigate against their willingness to 
support unions opposed by employers.23
And yet, in many ways, churches seemed to be a natural ally for the labor movement. 
While the heyday of the Social Gospel may have passed with the end of the Progressive Era, 
its influence was still felt among many ministers who championed the interests of the poor 
22 For an in-depth treatment of the New South ideology, see Gaston, Paul, The New South Creed: A Study In 
Southern Mythmaking, Random House, 1970.
23 Pope, Liston, Millhands and Preachers, A Study of Gastonia, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1942, pp. 
143-161.
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and the downtrodden.  Several denominations, most prominently the Roman Catholic 
Church, had officially endorsed the right of workers to join unions and engage in collective 
bargaining.  Moreover, the CIO had received help on occasion from ministers in the North 
during strikes and contract negotiations, assistance that had illustrated the advantages of 
religious support in dealing with employers.24  Despite accusations that the CIO was a 
godless, atheistic, and communistic outfit, many of the top leaders within the organization 
were, themselves, deeply religious,25 and indeed many within the labor movement felt that 
their work on behalf of organized labor was an outgrowth, and expression, of their 
commitment to the teachings of the gospel.  Finally, the South was not without its own 
tradition of socially progressive religious activism, although this constituted, by and large, a 
marginal thread within the larger fabric of conservative Southern Protestantism.26  For all of 
these reasons, there was some hope that a constructive relationship with Southern clergy 
could be established.
The attempt to form such a relationship forms the subject of this research.  More 
specifically, the subject that will be examined will be the Community Relations Department 
of the CIO, and its mission of outreach to the clergy of the South.  The organizers of 
Operation Dixie knew that community support would be essential to the success of the 
24 For a discussion of Catholicism and the CIO in the context of Detroit, including the role played by the 
Association of Catholic Trade Unionists (ACTU) in the UAW, see Lichtenstein, Nelson, Walter Reuther: The 
Most Dangerous Man in Detroit, Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1995, pp. 187-189.
25 Although it is perhaps worth noting that many of these leaders, including CIO president Phil Murray, were 
Roman Catholics, a denomination not heavily represented in the South as a whole, and practically negligible 
among textile workers.
26See for example Fannin, Mark, Labor's Promised Land: Radical Visions of Gender, Race, and Religion in the 
South, Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 2003, which analyzes the development of alternative religious 
understandings of Southern society within the Brotherhood of Timber Workers and the Southern Tenant 
Farmers Union. 
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Southern Organizing Drive.  It was out of consideration for local sensibilities, for example, 
that Operation Dixie’s first director, Van Bittner, made the decision to exclude known 
communists from the ranks of Operation Dixie organizers, and to focus on recruiting World 
War Two veterans and native Southerners as organizers for the campaign.  Indeed, Bittner 
went so far as to publicly repudiate the long-standing relationship between the CIO and the 
Southern Conference for Human Welfare (SCHW,) an organization of Southern liberals that 
had been accused (falsely) of being a communist front organization.27  The plan for Operation 
Dixie was to play down the northern base of the CIO, and the union federation’s policies on 
racial equality and liberal political activism, in order to present themselves in a more 
appealing light to Southerners.  While the success of these attempts is ultimately questionable 
in light of the drive’s results, they nonetheless indicate the lengths to which the CIO was 
willing to go in order to make the drive a success.  
When, in the early days of the campaign, organizer’s reports began to filter in citing 
the role of local clergy opposition as a reason for representation election defeats, the CIO 
leadership took these reports seriously.  The South has long been identified as one of the 
most religious regions in the country28, and the role of the local minister in small mill towns 
throughout the South was an important one.  Among highly religious Southern workers, the 
opposition of the clergy to unionization could be a significant impediment to the work of 
union organizers.  In order to address this challenge, the CIO created the Community 
27 Egerton, John, Speak Now Against the Day: The Generation Before the Civil Rights Movement in the South, 
Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1994, p. 444.
28 Matthews, Donald, “We Have Left Undone Those Things Which We Ought To Have Done: Southern 
Religious History in Retrospect and Prospect,” Church History, Vol. 67, No. 2, 1998, p. 305.
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Relations Department (CRD) headed by a Presbyterian layman, and United Steel Workers of 
America official, John Gates Ramsay.29  Ramsay had previous experience working with local 
clergy, most notably during the USWA’s victorious unionization campaign in Buffalo, New 
York.30  Because of this past experience, as well as Ramsay’s long history of active 
involvement in a variety of religious and community service organizations31, he was 
considered to be well qualified for the job of serving as the CIO’s liaison with Southern 
churchmen. 
Two fellow CIO staffers who aided Ramsay in this work were Lucy Randolph Mason 
and David Burgess.  Mason who had been working for the CIO since the mid 1930’s, was a 
powerful asset to the union for several reasons.  A dedicated and determined advocate of the 
interests of working people, Lucy Randolph Mason had been active in progressive causes for 
decades by the time of Operation Dixie.32  By the time that the Southern Organizing Drive 
was launched, Mason was an elderly, white-haired lady, whose grandmotherly looks were 
often deceptive.  Although always refined and genteel, Mason was a tireless and fiery activist 
who, though much more polite than Mother Jones, the famous labor agitator and “miner’s 
friend,” lacked none of her zeal or dedication.  In addition to her labor credentials, Mason 
also had the advantage of belonging to one of the most distinguished families of Virginia. 
29 Griffith, Crisis of American Labor, p. 110.
30 Fones-Wolf, Elizabeth and Fones-Wolf, Ken, ”Conversion At Bethlehem: Religion and Union Building in 
Steel, 1930-42, Labor History, Vol. 39, No. 4, 1998, p. 381.
31 For a more extensive overview of John Ramsay’s life and career, see Abrams, Brian, John Ramsay and the 
Evolution of Church- Labor Relations in the CIO, M.A. Thesis, Georgia State University, 1985.
32 Prior to working for the CIO, Mason had been the general secretary of the Richmond YWCA, and later the 
general secretary of the National Consumers League.  For a detailed description of Mason’s pre-CIO work, see: 
Mason, Lucy Randolph, To Win These Rights, New York: Harper & Brothers, 1952, pp. 1-18.
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Related to both the Masons and the Randolphs, she was also a relative of General Robert E. 
Lee, and counted Chief Justice John Marshall as one of her forebears.33  In short, Mason 
added a good deal of legitimacy and credibility to the CIO as it moved into the South.  David 
Burgess, who worked with Ramsay in addition to his other duties as an organizer in towns 
such as Rock Hill, South Carolina, was a recent graduate of Union Theological Seminary, 
and an ordained Congregationalist minister, and, as such, was uniquely situated to aid 
Ramsay in his efforts to cultivate the religious leadership of the South.34
Working with Mason and Burgess, John Ramsay lead the Community Relations 
Department’s efforts to combat the opposition of local ministers to the CIO organizing 
campaign, and to recruit labor-friendly clergy to bestow the blessings of organized religion 
on the efforts of organized labor.  As with Operation Dixie more generally, it is difficult to 
see the efforts of the CRD as notably successful.  While it is admittedly difficult to quantify 
the results of a campaign to win the hearts and minds of working people, it is clear that the 
CRD did not make the difference in the CIO’s efforts to unionize Southern workers. 
Moreover, while Ramsay was able to recruit some progressive ministers to the cause of 
organized labor, and was able to set up Religion and Labor Fellowship groups in various 
locales, it is by no means clear that these efforts did much to reduce the general opposition 
among ministers to the CIO.  Again the reasons for this failure, as with the Southern 
Organizing Drive in general, are many and varied.  In the pages that follow, some of these 
33 Mason, To Win These Rights, pp. xi-xii.
34 For an autobiographical account of Burgess’s life and work, see Burgess, David. Fighting For Social Justice:  
The Life Story of David Burgess, Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 2000.
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reasons will be explored, and explanations will be offered, some of them strategic, and some 
of them more philosophical in nature.
One of the prominent themes which will emerge in this analysis, hearkening back to 
Griffith’s critique concerning the use of “Northern methods,” is the issue of what might be 
termed the CIO’s “cultural competence” when it came to Southern society.  To what extent 
was the CRD’s approach to dealing with Southern clergy a realistic one, given the nature, 
structure, and societal role of Southern religion?  Did Ramsay’s attempts to reach local 
ministers reflect an understanding of organized religion and ecclesiastical structure more 
reflective of Northern conditions, than of the region in which he was working?  There are 
several compelling reasons to think that this might well have been the case, and as the record 
of the CRD is explored, these are among the primary issues to which we will be returning.
Before the CRD’s failings can be analyzed, however, its actual record must be 
examined, and the first four chapters of this study will be devoted to this task.  The first 
chapter will provide a general historical background dealing with the development and 
general shape of religion in the South, along with a more detailed history of the Community 
Relations Department, the reasons for its creation, its mission, and its activities.  Having laid 
the basic groundwork for a more in-depth study, the next three chapters will explore the 
actual work of the CRD.  While the work of the CRD was quite varied, its main endeavors 
can be divided into three rough categories.  
The first of these has to do with the efforts of Ramsay and his colleagues to answer 
the religious critics of the CIO in their own language.  These efforts were directed towards 
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the compilation of arguments, based on the Bible, and on the pronouncements of various 
denominational bodies, on the subject of organized labor, that supported the cause of labor 
and sanctioned the joining of unions.  These arguments were issued in the form of various 
pamphlets and leaflets that were distributed to local ministers and lay people.  In addition to 
written communication, both Ramsay and Mason devoted much of their time during these 
years to public speaking, touring the South speaking to various ministerial alliances in the 
towns in which the CIO was attempting to mount organizing drives.  These efforts, along 
with a critique of their effectiveness, and an analysis of their results, will form the basis of 
chapter two.  
Chapter three will encompass the second area in which the CRD focused its efforts, 
and indeed the effort that was its signature program: the creation of local Religion and Labor 
Fellowship groups.  These groups were designed to bring together religious and labor leaders 
in a friendly, and ostensibly neutral, environment for luncheons and lectures, in which issues 
of concern to the two groups could be discussed.  It was hoped that through these meetings a 
more convivial environment could be created for organizing efforts, that useful friendships, 
or at the least working relationships, could be created, and mutual understanding fostered. 
Ramsay was always convinced that the relationship between religion and labor was both 
natural, and mutually beneficial.  Indeed, Ramsay’s own commitment to organized labor was, 
in part, an outgrowth of his profound religious convictions, and he felt that labor and religion 
were natural allies in carrying out the social vision of the gospels.  In setting up Religion and 
Labor Fellowship groups, Ramsay’s goal was to bring these two forces – religion and labor – 
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together for their mutual benefit.  Particular attention will be paid here to the social, religious, 
and class backgrounds of the clerical representatives recruited by Ramsay for these groups, 
and what effect, if any, this might have had on their efficacy in promoting the efforts of the 
CIO organizing campaign.
A final arena in which the CRD operated, and the topic which will be considered in 
chapter four, was in refuting the claims of, and seeking to correct the damage done by, 
religiously oriented newspapers that attacked the CIO and attempted to persuade workers that 
joining a CIO union would be a violation of their Christian faith.  The two most prominent 
such newspapers were The Trumpet and The Militant Truth.  Both newspapers were 
consistent thorns in the side of the CIO in its attempt to organize the South.  These 
newspapers, reportedly financed by Southern manufacturers, denounced the CIO as godless, 
communistic, and immoral, and were frequently cited by union organizers as a factor in 
union election defeats.35  These newspapers, particularly The Militant Truth often found their 
way to worker’s mailboxes just prior to union elections, and many within the CIO suspected 
(with good cause) that this was not coincidental.36  The consistent message of these 
newspapers was that Christian workers could not be both good Christians and members of a 
labor union – that they must choose sides, one way or another.  Considering the deeply held 
religious convictions of many Southern workers, it seems likely that these appeals were taken 
seriously, and held the potential of swaying already wavering workers to vote against the 
35 As Michelle Brattain has noted, in addition to religious arguments against the CIO, these newspapers also 
frequently appealed to worker’s racism and anti-Semitism, pointing to the existence of Jewish union officials 
and arguing that the CIO supported racial integration.  See Brattain, Michelle, The Politics of Whiteness: Race,  
Workers, and Culture in the Modern South, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001, p. 127.
36 Griffith, Crisis of American Labor, p. 115.
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CIO.  Regardless of the actual efficacy of these newspapers in defeating organizing drives, 
they were clearly perceived as damaging by Ramsay and his colleagues, who devoted a good 
deal of their time and efforts towards discrediting these papers.  One particularly interesting 
episode in these ongoing endeavors concerns the well-known evangelist Billy Graham, one 
of whose sermons appeared in the pages of the Militant Truth.  Although Graham claimed 
that the article appeared without his permission, he refused to denounce the newspaper, much 
to the chagrin of Lucy Randolph Mason, whose correspondence with Graham forms one of 
the more interesting episodes in the career of the CRD.
Having surveyed the various programs of the Community Relations Department, the 
concluding chapter of this study will constitute and overall examination of the effectiveness 
of these efforts and attempt to explain their successes and failures.  While this analysis will, 
naturally, tend to revolve around issues of strategy and technique, there will also be a more 
philosophical component, dealing with issues of movement culture, internal democracy, and 
the rhetoric of social movements.  This discussion is informed by, and deeply indebted to, 
work done by Lawrence Goodwyn and Michael Kazin on the nature, and rhetorical language, 
of social movements in general, and populist movements in particular.  While it is perhaps 
not advisable to read too much into the history of this one department, it is perhaps possible 
to gain, through looking at the relations between the CIO and Southern churches, some 
insight into the nature, and the direction, of the labor movement more broadly.  Particularly 
relevant to this study will be the ongoing critique of the CIO that emphasizes a purported 
shift within that organization to a more “respectable and responsible” type of “business” 
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unionism, characterized by increased bureaucracy and hierarchical structure, in the aftermath 
of World War II.37  There has been much criticism of the CIO, mostly focused upon largely 
Northern unions such as the UAW and the USWA, that argues that, by the 1940s, the unions 
had become increasingly bureaucratic, and less concerned with the needs and desires of its 
rank-and-file membership than with forming a collegial working relationship with 
governmental and business elites.  Perhaps not surprisingly however, little attention has been 
given to how this transformation might have affected the CIO’s organizing efforts in the 
South.  For example, does the very structure of the CRD’s efforts to win over Southern 
clergy, themselves members of a civic elite, rather than build upon autonomous working-
class understandings of religion and labor, reflect a larger institutional culture that was 
seeking to achieve an accommodation with the larger society, rather than engaging in the 
confrontational style of working class assertiveness that supposedly characterized the early 
years of the CIO?  These are the sorts of issues that will be considered in the concluding 
section of this study.  While there are, perhaps, no definitive answers to these questions, they 
are important because they address the very central question of the nature, and purpose, of 
labor unions themselves.  Are unions simply a way for workers to improve their wages, 
hours, and conditions—the sort of “bread and butter” unionism espoused by Samuel 
Gompers, or are they something more, a vehicle for the transformation of society itself? 
Again while no definitive answers are perhaps possible, perhaps this discussion will, at the 
37 A shift which some historians, notably Nelson Lichtenstein, argue actually occurred well before the end of the 
Second World War.  See: Lichtenstein, Nelson, Labor's War at Home: The CIO in World War II, New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003.
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least, add an interesting angle to the continuing debate over the changing nature of the CIO 
as a democratic social movement as the labor confederation moved into the post-war period.
In a time when the relationship between progressive politics and Protestant 
fundamentalist religion has once again become a subject of intense interest, the experiences 
of the Community Relations Department are of renewed relevance.  As Michael Kazin has 
pointed out in his history of populism, The Populist Persuasion, populism and evangelical 
Christianity, intimately intertwined during the nineteenth century, have diverged significantly 
during the twentieth.38  John Ramsay’s efforts were, in many ways, an attempt to reconnect 
these historic partners under the umbrella of an insurgent labor movement.  That these efforts 
ultimately failed is significant, and worthy of further study.  On the face of it, Southern 
workers had much to gain in the 1940s and 50s by joining with the CIO, and yet they, by and 
large, did not choose to do so.  Admittedly, there were many factors at work in this outcome, 
not the least of which was the active opposition and repression exercised by Southern 
employers.  But one factor, frequently cited by organizers, was the element of religious 
disapproval directed towards organized labor.
Twenty-first century observers have noted that working-class people often act against 
their perceived economic interests because of religion.  This is not a new phenomenon. 
People act on the basis of a wide variety of motivations.  While to those who tend to view the 
world in economic terms, the idea that race or religion might sometimes trump class may be 
puzzling, it is, nonetheless, empirically true.  If Thomas Frank can ask “what’s the matter 
38 Kazin, Michael, The Populist Persuasion: An American History, Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1998, 
p. 4.
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with Kansas,” at the beginning of the twenty-first century, so might labor historians studying 
Operation Dixie ask what’s the matter with South Carolina?  Or, for that matter, with the 
South in general?  And the answer is, in part, religion.  Religion, and more specifically the 
vocal opposition of Southern clergy to the CIO during Operation Dixie, was one of the many 
weapons within the arsenal of those who opposed the expansion of the CIO into Southern 
industry.  The CIO attempted to counter this opposition with a sustained effort to win the 
support of Southern clergy.  For many reasons, which this study will seek to examine, this 
effort was not, ultimately, successful, but the fact that it was tried at all is quite interesting 
and revealing.  Even more interesting is the actual story of the Community Relations 
Department and the work that they did during this crucial period of post-war labor expansion. 
The efforts of the CRD form a tale replete with historical possibilities, tantalizing prospects, 
and consistent frustrations.  What follows is an attempt to make sense of that story.           
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Chapter Two: The Big Picture Argument
In the introduction, several theories concerning the failure of Operation Dixie were 
discussed.  Although there is much merit in many of these theories, almost all of them are 
lacking in one way or another.  Whether placing the blame for Operation Dixie’s failure on 
the southern workers whom the CIO was attempting to organize, or upon the employers who 
resisted organizing efforts, or even upon impersonal economic forces which combined to 
lessen the appeal of the CIO’s pitch, what most of these explanations have in common is that 
the place the blame for the CIO’s failure everywhere but with the CIO itself.  This approach 
is not entirely wrong, per se, and indeed, there is quite a lot of truth to the argument that 
external forces played a decisive role in the failure of Operation Dixie.  Indeed, the use of 
extra-legal violence and official repression against union organizers, coupled with the failure 
of the Federal government to aggressively enforce the provisions of the existing labor law, 
combined, in large part, to make the success of the campaign well-nigh impossible.  And yet, 
by focusing purely on external factors, it is impossible to see the complete picture, and a key 
factor is overlooked.   
To be sure, there have been some criticisms of the CIO here and there.  Griffith points 
out, quite correctly, that the CIO should have devoted more resources, both in terms of 
money and manpower, towards the organizing effort.39  Other historians, notably Robert 
Korstad, suggest that the CIO mistakenly wasted its organizing efforts on white textile 
workers, rather than black industrial workers who would have been more receptive to the 
39 Griffith, The Crisis of American Labor, p. 26.
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CIO and more likely to join one of its unions.40  Finally, some observers have criticized the 
CIO for failing to make use of experienced Communist Party members whose organizing 
experience was unparalleled, and who had proven their worth in earlier organizing efforts in 
the North.41  Unfortunately, none of these arguments are particularly convincing, nor do any 
of them tell the whole story.  
It is true that the Operation Dixie was under-funded, especially considering the 
geographical size of its organizing arena, and the sheer numbers of workers that it was set to 
recruit.  However, it is hard to think of any union organizing campaign, ever, which has been 
adequately funded.  Union organizers work under perpetually unfavorable conditions, and yet 
have, at other times, and in other places, somehow managed to muddle through.  A lack of 
resources can, at best, only partially explain the failure of Operation Dixie’s organizers.42 
The other two arguments are even less compelling.  While it is true that black workers were, 
on the whole, much more likely to join CIO unions, focusing on organizing in black 
dominated industries would have made little impact on the overall economy of the south. 
The largest industry in the southern economy, far and away, was the textile industry, which 
was almost completely white.  Historically, black workers had been excluded from all but the 
most marginal employment in the textile industry, a situation that would not begin to change 
40 Korstad, Civil Rights Unionism, p. 299.
41 Honey, Southern Labor and Black Civil Rights, p. 229.
42 Indeed, it is worth noting that Operation Dixie failed to gain traction even in situations where lack of 
organizers was not a problem.  For example, in the Kannapolis, N.C. drive, ten organizers (half the total for the 
entire state) were committed to the organizing effort, and still very little progress was made, and an election was 
never held.  If Operation Dixie failed to interest workers in union membership even in those instances where 
ample organizing resources were available, then it seems clear that some other factor, besides limited resources, 
was involved.  On the whole, it seems likely that the problem lay less with the number of organizers, than with 
the approach taken by the organizers.  For an in-depth analysis of the Kannapolis drive, see Griffith, The Crisis 
of American Labor, pp. 46-61.
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until the 1960s.  Moreover, the likely result of focusing on organizing black workers would 
have been to alienate white textile workers, workers who were often racist themselves, and 
who benefited economically and socially from the system of white supremacy.43  While 
organizing black workers might have been a morally correct thing to do, it would not have 
led to the fundamental economic change in the southern economy that the CIO was seeking. 
Finally, given the ideological climate of the South in the late 1940s and early 1950s, it is 
difficult to see how employing communist cadre organizers would have been anything other 
than a complete disaster.  Even downplaying their past connections with members of the CP, 
the CIO was subject to relentless red-baiting during the course of Operation Dixie, a situation 
that would have been even worse had the CIO fielded actual communists as organizers.44   
What all of these explanations miss, I will argue, is the central fact that the CIO failed 
to offer southern workers a compelling reason to join a union during the course of Operation 
Dixie.  This is not to say that compelling reasons did not exist, as they certainly did. 
Southern workers, compared to their counterparts in the North, were paid less, worked more, 
and had much less of a say in their working conditions.  Even more fundamentally, southern 
workers lacked societal respect and social and economic power.  From being derided as “lint 
heads” to standing powerless before the company’s decision to decrease its workforce, 
increase production, or lower wages, southern workers were very clearly the junior partner in 
the power relationship that characterized southern industry.  The irony, of course, is that this 
43 For an exploration of the ways in which white textile workers benefited from, and embraced, the system of 
white supremacy, see Michelle Brattain, The Politics of Whiteness, Princeton University Press, 2001, 
particularly pp. 3-10.
44 For an overview of the uses to which anti-communism was put in attacking the CIO, see Minchin, What Do 
We Need a Union For?, pp. 44-47.
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is precisely the situation to which the CIO had addressed itself to in the North, with its 
promotion of “industrial democracy,” aiming to give workers a voice in their workplaces.  In 
the North, through the achievement of contracts that guaranteed seniority, a strong system of 
shop stewards, and a grievance procedure, this power imbalance had been, if not wholly 
rectified, at the least noticeably reduced.  
What is notable about the Southern Organizing Drive, and what, ultimately, ensured 
its failure, was the omission of this vision for economic democracy from the recruiting pitch 
of the CIO.  To a remarkable degree the organizers of Operation Dixie limited their appeal to 
the traditional “bread and butter” issues of unionism: wages, hours and conditions.  The 
problem with this approach was two-fold.  In the first place, basic economic issues were not a 
burning concern among Southern workers in the years just after World War II.  Wages, 
although lower than the going rate in the north, were increasing, and were good by the 
standards of the Southern economy.  As Timothy Minchin has pointed out, southern workers 
were doing much better economically, both in terms of wages and in terms of access to 
consumer goods, than ever before.45  Secondly, by limiting its appeal to the economic plane, 
the CIO made it fairly easy for employers to rebut its argument that workers had to join a 
union if they wanted their finances to improve.  Employers in the post-war era demonstrated 
a willingness to raise wages in order to avoid unionization of their workforces.  In effect, if 
workers could get a pay raise without joining a union, they perceived little need to stick their 
necks out by signing a union card.  Employers utilized a sort of carrot and stick approach to 
45 Minchin, What Do We Need a Union For?, pp. 48-68.
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thwarting unionization.  One the one hand, they offered to raise wages on their own, and on 
the other, they threatened dire consequences if their workers insisted on joining a union, 
including the prospect of shutting down the plant completely.46  Moreover, southern workers 
were well aware of the recent past, when union organizing campaigns and strikes, notably the 
1934 General Textile Strike, had resulted in violence and bloodshed, often the result of 
employer’s use of armed guards and militia.47  In effect, by limiting their appeal to simply 
economic issues, the CIO was asking southern workers to risk their jobs, perhaps even their 
lives, for a pay raise that they could usually get without even joining the union.  Simply put, 
it is possible to convince a person to risk his or her life and well-being for a grand ideal, a 
vision of a better, more just society, but it is not possible to convince a person to risk it all for 
a fifteen cent per hour pay raise.  By downplaying the vision of fundamental social change 
that had characterized the vibrant early CIO in its northern phase, Operation Dixie was 
asking southern workers to put it all on the line for very little in terms of tangible, 
perceptible, benefit.  
What this strategy reveals is a fundamental incompatibility between the goals of the 
CIO in Operation Dixie and its methodology.  The goals of the CIO, to unionize the South in 
order to protect its northern unions, shift the political makeup of Congress to the left, and 
secure the gains made by the union during World War Two and the New Deal, required 
nothing less than massive social change, change that would remake the whole character of 
the South.  This vision represented a degree of social change that simply could not be 
46 Ibid., p. 51.
47 For a general overview of the 1934 strike, including a discussion of the role of violence and official 
repression, see Hall, et al, Like A Family, pp. 328-354.
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achieved through a run-of-the-mill organizing campaign.  Just as the later Civil Rights 
Movement required a level of organizing and commitment that reached well beyond merely 
organizing new local branches of the NAACP, so would the restructuring of southern society 
and the southern economy require more than simply organizing local unions.  
As Lawrence Goodwyn has pointed out in his landmark history of the Populist 
Movement, The Populist Moment, change does not occur simply because it is needed, or 
because “times are hard.”  Indeed, throughout human history, times have often been hard, 
and yet meaningful social change is a relatively rare phenomenon.48  Rather, Goodwyn 
asserts, social change comes about as a result of the hard work of social movements, 
movements that, in response to a perceived need for change among its members, proceed to 
organize, educate, and agitate for change.  Social movements are, fundamentally, movements 
that oppose the existing status quo, what Goodwyn terms the “received culture,” a culture 
that we are all a part of, and whose rules we have all internalized and been socialized to 
accept.  The received culture is made up of cultural assumptions about power, who possesses 
it, and what uses it may legitimately be put to.  Out of these assumptions grow hierarchies of 
social power and position, what Goodwyn terms “patterns of deference.”  Those segments of 
society that benefit from this hierarchical system of power and deference, naturally are keen 
to preserve their traditional status, and thus tend to oppose moves towards change.  The role 
of a social movement then, in Goodwyn’s theory, is first, to educate its members as to the 
realities of power relations within the received culture, and secondly, through the creation of 
48 Goodwyn, Lawrence, The Populist Moment, Oxford University Press, 1978, p. x.
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self-respect and political self-confidence, to struggle against these inherited patterns of 
deference so that social change can be achieved.49  
In light of this analysis of the means and ends of social change, and social reform 
movements, it rapidly becomes clear how the CIO went astray in its attempts to organize the 
South in Operation Dixie.  The CIO, which had fulfilled the function of a social movement 
during its early organizational phase in the North, had abandoned many of these key 
elements by the time it came south in 1946.  There are several reasons why this was so. 
Robert Zieger has argued that the leaders of the CIO were, primarily, not radicals at all, but 
more or less practical union leaders who were concerned with the well-being of their 
membership above and beyond any vision of achieving radical changes in society.50  On the 
whole, and particularly as it relates to Philip Murray, who headed the Congress of Industrial 
Organizations throughout the period of Operation Dixie, this is probably a correct 
assessment.51  And yet, the CIO had accomplished a series of radical changes in the power 
relations that characterized northern industry by the end of the Second World War.  When 
one compares the situation in, for example, automobile manufacturing prior to 1937 with that 
prevailing a decade later, it is hard not to conclude that the CIO had fundamentally 
transformed labor-management relations.  More importantly, this change was accomplished 
49 This theoretical framework is laid out more thoroughly in Goodwyn, The Populist Moment, pp. vii-xxiv.
50 Zieger, The CIO, pp. 240-41.
51 Murray’s conservative approach to the issue of power relations within industry can be seen in a telling 
incident cited by Robert Zieger.  The CIO issued a pamphlet titled Should Labor Have a Direct Share In 
Management? in 1946 in which Philip Murray expressed the position of the CIO on the issue of workplace 
control.  According to Zieger, Murray “called only for a ‘new kind of [industrial] manager,’ one who would 
encourage employees to take an active interest in the firm’s affairs, and who would listen to worker’s ideas. 
‘Organized labor,’ Murray affirmed, ‘does not question management’s right to run business.”  Zieger, The CIO, 
p. 323.
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by challenging, head-on, the received work culture prevailing at employers such as General 
Motors, demonstrating that, at least early on, the CIO had been willing to confront and 
contest the cultural assumptions that supported northern industry.  
At some point, during the Second World War, or perhaps a few years earlier, a 
perceptible shift began to occur in the attitude of the CIO towards society.  Nelson 
Lichtenstein, among others, has argued that the CIO, beginning with its involvement with 
New Deal agencies, particularly the National Labor Relations Board, and increasing through 
its cooperation with the Roosevelt administration during the course of the war, reached a sort 
of accommodation with government power through which it became a partner with the 
government in insuring social and economic stability.52  On the one hand, this served to 
provide protection to the CIO at a vulnerable stage of its existence against the attacks of its 
enemies in the business community, while on the other hand it served the interest that the 
government had in stability, by constraining the CIO in its freedom to advance its interests 
through the use of socially, and economically disruptive strikes.  Whether one views this 
bargain as wise and practical, or as a Faustian sell-out, the result was to give the CIO much 
more of a practical stake in preserving the status quo than it otherwise would have had. 
Some additional consideration should be given to the quite remarkably changed ideological 
climate of the mid 1940s as opposed to that which had prevailed during the Great 
Depression.  With the passing of Roosevelt from the political scene, the end of the war, and 
with the political and cultural shift to the right which marked the years immediately 
52 This process of accommodation with the New Deal state is extensively documented in Lichtenstein, Nelson, 
Labor’s War At Home, Cambridge University Press, 1983.
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following the end of the war, radicalism of any stripe was decidedly less acceptable to the 
society at large.  In this climate, the CIO became increasingly concerned with projecting an 
image of itself as a mature and “responsible” labor union, a body that was dedicated to 
preserving and defending the American way of life.  To all of the preceding factors must be 
added the fact that Philip Murray was himself a much more practical, and a much less 
flamboyant, leader than his predecessor, John L. Lewis, a man who may be charitably 
characterized as a bit of a maverick.  
Finally, and this is a factor whose importance to the outcome of Operation Dixie was 
to be pivotal, was the perception among the planners of Operation Dixie, particularly its 
director, Van Bittner, that it was important to modify the image of the CIO in such as way as 
to not offend the sensibilities of southerners.  As Douglas Flamming has argued, this attitude 
“suggests one of the major problems with the drive – namely, that the CIO’s national leaders 
viewed the South as a different country.53”  In some ways, no doubt, the South did represent 
an organizing challenge different, and distinct, from that of the North.  For example, southern 
industry, particularly in textiles, was structured quite differently from that in the North, and 
issues of race certainly played a more prominent role in southern society, and in southern 
industry than was the case in the North.  However, the CIO’s perceptions of the differentness 
of the South, and southern culture went much further than this.  In general, southern workers 
were viewed with a fair amount of suspicion and often out-right condescension.  Several 
years prior to Operation Dixie, Solomon Barkin, the research director for the TWUA had 
53 Flamming, Douglas, Creating the Modern South, University of North Carolina Press, 1992, p. 249.
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written "the Southern Textile Worker is a small-town, suspicious individual, who is 
extremely provincial, petty, gossip-mongering, who is completely isolated and knows only 
his mill.54”  This perception of southern workers, coupled with the generally conservative 
social climate of the post-war period, seemed to suggest that the CIO would not get very far 
with the militant approach that it had used in the North.  It was with this consideration in 
mind that Bittner made the decision to avoid controversy by severing any association 
between Operation Dixie and the CIO’s Political Action Committee (PAC,) excluding known 
or suspected communists from the ranks of Operation Dixie organizers, downplaying the 
CIO’s position on race and civil rights, and, to the extent possible, using native white 
southerners as organizers.  
Unfortunately, by seeking to strip Operation Dixie of anything that could even 
remotely be considered controversial or inflammatory, the CIO effectively removed that 
element of challenging the received culture that made the CIO a social movement with a 
powerful vision of social change.  It is perhaps easier to perceive this process in retrospect 
than it was at the time.  No doubt the planners of Operation Dixie perceived their efforts as a 
practical approach to dealing with a regional culture that was much less friendly towards the 
idea of industrial unionism than was the North.  And, indeed, some of these decisions, such 
as the decision to proceed cautiously on the issue of race, were probably wise ones. 
Unfortunately, the net result was a campaign that was so intent on appearing non-threatening 
that it was unable to present a truly coherent view of the problems of southern industrial life, 
54 Quoted in Griffith, The Crisis of American Labor, p. 165.
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or an alternative social vision that was capable of engaging and attracting potential new 
members.  
Prior to 1946, southern workers had demonstrated, in the strikes of 1929 and 1934, 
that they were receptive to visions of a re-ordered set of economic and social relations that 
would provide them with dignity, a voice in their workplace, and more power in their 
relationship with their employer.  The great resentment against the stretch-out system that 
prompted the General Strike in 1934 was a reflection of more than simply economic 
concerns, it reflected a deep dissatisfaction with the prevailing industrial culture of the textile 
south, in which workers stood helpless before the demands of management for increased 
production at whatever the cost.  
The prevailing view in southern labor history for many years was that there was 
something in the nature of the southern worker, some personality trait, some defect of 
culture, that explained why the south didn’t have labor unions.  Thanks to a generation of 
historians who have studied labor in the South over the past twenty or so years, we now 
know that southerners, on the whole, were no less class conscious, or incapable of 
understanding the logic of union than any other set of workers, and indeed, that they 
possessed a great deal of agency in shaping both their own lives, and the development of 
southern industry.55  In this era of post-exceptionalism56, it is no longer sufficient to place all 
55 Although this is a theme which runs throughout what has been called the “new” Southern labor history, two 
especially significant works in this vein are Hall, et al., Like A Family, and Flamming, Creating the Modern 
South.
56 For a detailed, and helpfully concise overview of recent trends in Southern labor history, see Michelle 
Brattain, “The Pursuits of Post-Exceptionalism” in Glenn Eskew, ed., Labor in the Modern South, University of 
Georgia Press, 2001, pp. 1-46.
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of the responsibility for the failure of unions to take hold in the south upon southern workers. 
Instead, we must cast our net a little further afield in order to understand this central 
phenomenon of southern economic history.  While there is no one, easy answer, it seems 
clear that at least one factor is the failure of the labor movement itself to present its case 
compellingly.  It is not the intent of this work to present a grand master explanation that 
covers the entirety of southern labor history, but rather to argue that, for this one, important, 
episode in the economic history of the south, one of the major reasons for the failure of 
unionism was the union itself.  Through pitching its case almost entirely upon the plane of 
bread-and-butter economic issues, while neglecting the larger duties of a social movement to 
identify cultural assumptions harmful to its constituents, to educate its members, both present 
and prospective, upon the issues, and to agitate for change through confronting traditional 
patterns of deference and oppression, the CIO doomed its efforts to attract members and 
placed itself in a position of perceived irrelevancy.
The sad spectacle that too often emerges from this situation is of an insurgent social 
movement that, by seeking to appear as something it is not, finds itself in the awkward 
position of seeking to mobilize the very pillars of the existing social hierarchy in order to 
achieve social change antagonistic to its own interests.  Such, for instance, is the basic reality 
of the CIO attempting to convince employers that they should cooperate with the union in 
order to achieve a stable workforce, regimented by a “responsible” and “mature” industrial 
union.  Again, we have the incongruous picture of organizers in the factory town of 
Kannapolis, North Carolina, careful not to speak too harshly of Charles Cannon, the 
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paternalistic operator of Cannon Mills, in order not to offend his cowed workers.  Perhaps the 
most glaring example of this tendency was the decision to exclude PAC work from Operation 
Dixie.  To a very great extent, the existing political structure of the South, with its limited 
franchise and concentration of political power in the hands of a tiny economic and social 
elite, was highly implicated in the perpetuation of an oppressive economic regime, a regime 
that victimized the very workers that the CIO was attempting to organize.  Moreover, given 
that one of the central purposes of Operation Dixie was to lay the basis for a political 
transformation of the South, the decision to exclude political work from the campaign is 
more than a little puzzling.  To make the decision to ignore this factor, in order to avoid 
controversy, seems to ignore the very basis of the problem.57
One of the most glaring failures of this type, and the subject of the present work, is 
the project of the Community Relations Department under John Gates Ramsay.  The mission 
of the CRD seemed straightforward enough, in brief it was designed to deal with criticism of 
Operation Dixie on the part of local religious leaders who often sought to sway their 
congregations against joining with the CIO.  The manner in which Ramsay sought to achieve 
57 Of course, it could be argued that focusing on PAC would have hampered the union’s organizing ability, in 
that PAC was a highly controversial program that was viewed with a great deal of hostility and suspicion by 
opponents of organized labor who felt that the CIO was overstepping its legitimate authority by seeking to tell 
its members how to vote, and thus behaving in a non-democratic, perhaps even communistic manner.  It is true 
that by playing down the role of PAC, the CIO probably avoided some criticism that it might have otherwise 
received, and the decision might even have been, on a purely pragmatic level, a prudent one.  However, it is 
also true that one of the primary needs confronting a budding social movement is the need to give its new 
recruits something to do, an activity to get involved in, and a sense of purpose.  PAC work, I would argue, 
would have fit the bill perfectly, and could have provided a sense of purpose and a measure of cohesion that 
was otherwise lacking.  The question is really one of whether the positive benefits of PAC work, in terms of 
promoting activism and building a movement culture would have outweighed the negative results of increased 
criticism for the CIO’s perceived authoritarianism.  My own view is that PAC would have helped more than it 
would have hurt, but there is certainly room for legitimate disagreement on this issue, and it is probably 
impossible to formulate a definitive answer.
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this mission, however, reflects many of the problems already identified in the approach of 
Operation Dixie as a whole.  The following chapters will explore in some detail how Ramsay 
proceeded.  The general conclusion that this study finds is that, in addition to a variety of 
tactical and strategic blunders (which illustrated Ramsay’s lack of understanding of the very 
nature of southern religion, and the structure of the major denominations represented in the 
South) Ramsay’s approach was fundamentally anti-thetical to the methods and aims of a 
social movement.  What Ramsay attempted to do, with the best intentions imaginable, no 
doubt, was to mobilize a segment of the existing power structure dominating southern society 
against its very own vested interests.  It is essential in this regard to recognize that the 
religious leadership of the South did not represent the figure of a disinterested bystander in 
the contest between the CIO and southern manufacturers.  Rather, southern religious leaders 
were, themselves, members of a civic elite, power brokers in their own right, who had played 
a role in the boosterism which made possible the growth of southern industry, had close ties, 
both social, and economic, with southern industrialists, and who had, in short, a powerful 
stake in maintaining the status quo.58  In attempting to interest religious civic leaders in the 
campaign of the CIO, a campaign, which, if effective, would have undermined the inherited 
power and privilege of these very same civic leaders, Ramsay was, at best, illustrating a 
fundamental misperception of the social realities of the South, and, at worst, undermining the 
very cause which he was attempting to further.  That Ramsay was ultimately unsuccessful in 
wooing this section of the civic elite to endorse the cause of industrial unionism is not 
58 The classic account of this relationship can be found in Liston Pope, Millhands and Preachers, Yale 
University Press, 1942.  For a thorough overview of the ways in which ministers assisted in, and actively 
promoted, the rise of the cotton mill economy, see Chapter Two, especially pages 21-27.
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particularly surprising.  What is tragic, however, is the waste of effort that this project 
represented, particularly when it is apprehended that Ramsay’s considerable talents could 
have been better utilized in seeking to marshal that portion of southern religious sentiment 
that could very well have been beneficial to the cause of the CIO.  
Although the nature of Southern religion will be explored in greater depth and detail 
in the following chapters, it is worth noting at this point that there are multiple streams which 
make up Christianity in the South, as indeed there are in all regions.  One of these facets of 
Southern religion, and one that could have proven extraordinarily helpful to the CIO in 
combating the opposition it received from more institutional churches, is what may be termed 
“prophetic Christianity.”  It is this prophetic strain of southern religion, with its heavy 
emphasis on social justice, equality, and the rights of the poor and oppressed, which 
characterized the non-violent Civil Rights struggle of the 1950s and 1960s, and which, 
indeed, has a deep history in the South as a whole.  While this variety of Christianity is most 
famous, perhaps, in connection with the struggle for Black equality and civil rights, it is a 
tradition that is, by no means, limited to the African-American churches of the south.  On the 
contrary, this tradition is one common to both races, and one which has served as a powerful 
motivating factor in a variety of Southern economic and political struggles.59  With its 
disregard for social hierarchy and insistence that “God is no respecter of persons60,” this is a 
style of religious thought that seems tailor-made for the counter-hegemonic vision that must 
59 See for example, Fannin, Mark, Labor’s Promised Land, University of Tennessee Press, 2003, for an 
exploration of the role of religion in the Southern Tenant Farmers Union and in the Brotherhood of Timber 
Workers.
60 Acts 10:34-35
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be present to provide inspiration and motivation for a movement dedicated to social change. 
That this source of potential strength was not tapped by the CIO, which instead attempted to 
mobilize existing patterns of deference and authority by appealing to established ministers 
and churches represents perhaps one of the greatest ironies of the Community Relations 
project of the CIO.61                  
Although it is to be hoped for that the argument outlined here, in its general form, will 
become increasingly clear as it is applied concretely to specific instances in the following 
chapters, it will, perhaps, be useful to address a few possible misconceptions regarding my 
argument here, at the outset.  Most importantly, it must be stressed that this is not a single-
factor analysis of the failure of Operation Dixie.  I am not attempting to prove that the 
tactical approach adopted by the Community Relations Department played a decisive role in 
the failure of CIO organizers to gain recruits during their organizing campaigns.  Rather, in 
using the CRD as a case study, I am attempting to illustrate a deeper, underlying, pattern, one 
that I argue characterized the conduct of Operation Dixie as a whole.  While similar 
arguments could well be made focusing on other aspects of the campaign, the role of PAC 
activity, for example, the history of the CRD represents an aspect of Operation Dixie that has 
been little studied, and which, I believe, forms an interesting chapter in the story of Operation 
Dixie as a whole.
61 Some ministers, notably those associated with the Holiness churches, including Don West and Charlie Pratt of 
the Church of God of the Union Assembly, did become involved with the CIO and attempted to use their 
leadership positions to champion industrial unionism.  However, these ministers were not courted in any 
systematic way by the CRD, and, in the case of the two mentioned above, were sometimes viewed with a fair 
amount of suspicion.  For an account of the activities of the Church of God of the Union Assembly, and the role 
of anti-communism in the defeat of organizing efforts in the South, see Flamming, Creating the Modern South, 
pp. 289-306.
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Further, while I strongly believe that the general attitude towards the South that this 
policy reflects contributed to the ultimate failure of Operation Dixie, I readily concede that it 
was not the sole factor in the campaign’s failure.  It is, indeed, quite likely that even had the 
CIO adopted the attitude of an insurgent social movement, challenging the hierarchy and 
power structure of the South, that the campaign would have failed, perhaps more quickly, 
and more miserably that it, in fact, did.  Perhaps, when one considers the sheer amount of 
repression and stubborn opposition that the CIO was met with, by employers, civic groups, 
terrorist organizations such as the Ku Klux Klan, and by state and local government, the 
campaign might have failed even more spectacularly.  
What I am arguing, however, is that by failing to elaborate a clear and compelling 
counter-hegemonic vision of social change for the South, the CIO precluded itself from ever 
having a realistic chance at achieving its goals.  By limiting its appeal to basic economic 
issues such as wage increases, while failing to explain the implications of unions for the 
fundamental economic and social structure of the South, the CIO, in effect, gave southern 
workers, cognizant of the repression and hostility that they would face just by joining a 
union, very little reason to make the momentous decision to cast their lot with organized 
labor.  People simply do not join social movements, and stay with them, for small 
adjustments in the status quo, particularly not when these adjustments may be gained in a 
more painless fashion.  By focusing so narrowly on the issue of wages, and downplaying the 
socially transformative implications of unionization, the CIO made it possible for employers 
to effectively counter their efforts by granting small wage increases to their employees, a 
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form of insurance against unionization which has, indeed, characterized much of industrial 
practice for many decades.  Again, although the articulation of an expansive vision for social 
change may not have insured the success of Operation Dixie, the lack of one certainly 
hampered any possibility that the plan may have had for success.  In much the same way, as 
we will see in the coming chapters, the CRD’s attempt to achieve religious sanction for the 
CIO, while avoiding controversy and courting the guardians of the status quo likewise 
stymied any possibility for achieving real change, and helped to stall the process of 
unionization in the industrial South.  
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Chapter Three: Stemming the Tide
During the course of Operation Dixie, the CIO encountered many obstacles to its 
organizing efforts.  Some of these obstacles were expected ones, resistance on the part of 
employers who attempted to fire union sympathizers, unfriendly policemen and judges who 
made life difficult for organizers, and potential recruits who were dubious concerning the 
value of union membership.  Other obstacles were somewhat less expected.  
One day in August of 1946, during the early months of Operation Dixie, in the small 
town of Hogansville, Georgia, a local Baptist minister, the Rev. Marcus Drake of Antioch 
Baptist Church, approached the gates of the U.S. Rubber plant that the CIO was attempting to 
organize.  The minister had brought some leaflets with him to the gates that day, which he 
began to pass around.  These leaflets denounced the CIO in no uncertain terms as constituting 
“the mark of the Beast,” invoking the demonic forces prophesied in the Book of Revelation 
to warn workers away from involvement with the CIO.  This same minister later preached 
sermons against the CIO, and published a letter in the local newspaper attacking the union 
and its organizing drive.  While this incident was, no doubt, shocking to organizers, it was 
not uncommon.62
Several years later, in 1949, on the eve of a representation election at a textile plant in 
Marietta, Georgia, the Reverend J. A. Landers of Clarksdale Baptist Church took to the 
airwaves of WFOM to denounce the CIO, and to urge its defeat in the upcoming NLRB 
62 “The Role of the Churches In Relation to the CIO Southern Organizing Drive,” Folder 16, Box 1556, John 
Gates Ramsay Papers, Southern Labor Archives, Special Collections Department, Georgia State University, 
Atlanta. (Hereinafter referred to as “John Ramsay Papers.”)
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election.  Rev. Landers blasted the CIO as an outside “intruder,” as “communist,” as “un-
American and un-democratic,” and quoting various scriptures to the effect that workers 
should be content with their wages, denounced the CIO by flatly stating that “it isn’t Bible.” 
Urging his listeners to accept his interpretation as correct, Rev. Landers stated that “If the 
Bible says it, I believe it, and that settles it and we all will profit by its guidance.63”  
Opposition to the CIO cloaked in Biblical justification was not, however, limited to 
Georgia.  Throughout the South, from Tennessee to Texas, CIO organizers encountered 
preachers who urged their followers to reject the CIO in the name of Christianity.  In Lyman, 
South Carolina, during a drive at the Pacific Mills in 1949, a Baptist minister told his 
congregation that “its either Christ or the CIO,” adding that “you can either be a Christian or 
a CIO man, but you can’t be both!”  In Tennessee, the CIO state director, Paul Christopher 
was faced with an evangelist named J. Harold Smith, the man who reportedly created the oft-
quoted slogan that CIO stood for “Christ Is Out – Communism Is On.64”
These incidents were bad enough from a public relations perspective, but it appeared 
that such attacks were also successful in undermining organization efforts.  Dave Burgess, a 
CIO organizer in South Carolina, felt that “the CIO has lost two NLRB representation 
elections at the Aragon-Baldwin Mill in Rock Hill, S.C., largely because of the active 
opposition of the Northside Baptist Church leaders and minister.65”  Other organizers 
63 Letter from David Burgess to Robert Cahoon March 26, 1950, Folder 155, Box 1568, John Gates Ramsay 
Papers.
64 Ibid.
65 Ibid.
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reported similar experiences, blaming religious opposition for their inability to conduct an 
effective organizing drive.  
Religious opposition to the CIO came in a variety of forms and formats.  As already 
mentioned, sometimes this opposition took the form of individual preachers using their 
pulpits to denounce the CIO and urge their congregations against unionism.  Sometimes this 
opposition took a more slick and polished form.  Several newspapers, often mailed to 
workers at plants that had been targeted by the CIO for organization, attacked the CIO in 
primarily religious terms.  The most notorious of these were the Militant Truth, and the 
Gospel Trumpet.  The Gospel Trumpet was a newspaper published by “Parson Jack” 
Johnson, a Baptist minister in Columbus, Georgia, whose efforts were subsidized by textile 
manufacturers, including the Bibb Manufacturing Company, whose plant in Porterdale, 
Georgia was the targeted by the CIO for organization.66  The Militant Truth, published by 
Sherman Patterson, had a wider circulation than the Gospel Trumpet, and was the longer 
lasting of the two, continuing to be published up through the 1970s.  Both newspapers 
attacked the CIO as a communist organization devoted to the destruction of the American 
way of life, and anti-thetical to the teachings of Christianity.  Both publications also had a 
tendency to find their way into worker’s mailboxes in the days leading up to a representation 
election.  
It is difficult to quantify exactly to what degree these attacks hurt the CIO in its 
organizing efforts.  When workers voted against the CIO during a representation election 
66 The Role of the Churches In Relation to the CIO Southern Organizing Drive,” Folder 16, Box 1556, John 
Gates Ramsay Papers.
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they did not give their reasons for doing so.  Some workers, no doubt, were not influenced at 
all by religious criticism of the CIO.  Some workers supported the union despite such attacks, 
and many probably voted against it for a variety of other reasons.  It is likely that some 
workers, wavering in their decision about whether or not to vote for the union, were 
influenced by religious arguments, or used them to justify a decision that they had already 
made for other reasons.  Despite the difficulties involved, years after the fact, in untangling 
the motives of Southern workers, there is no doubt that organizers at the time felt that these 
attacks were having a negative effect on their efforts.
These religious attacks, although not entirely unexpected, must have, due to their 
personal nature and sheer virulence, come as a bit of a shock to many of the leaders of the 
CIO who were, by and large, religious men themselves.  Moreover, the CIO had enjoyed 
generally good relations with religious leaders in the North, particularly with the Roman 
Catholic Church, although also with representatives of the mainline Protestant 
denominations.  Indeed, it was common practice for CIO conventions during this period to 
open with a benediction from a priest or minister, and leaders of the CIO, particularly the 
organization’s president, Philip Murray, often spoke of the CIO as acting out, in worldly 
affairs, the principles of Christianity.  Given these factors, the assault on the CIO by religious 
leaders in the South must have come as somewhat of a surprise, and have been perceived as 
not simply hurtful, but as deeply unfair.  It is, after all, one thing to go into an organizing 
situation knowing that one is likely to be attacked by clergy who see no need for unionism in 
their community, and quite another to be denounced as an agent of the Antichrist.  
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But there was a more practical consideration as well.  If, as organizers were reporting, 
these attacks were hindering organization efforts, indeed, causing the union to lose 
representation elections, then something had to be done to address the problem.  As noted, 
the CIO had generally positive relations with religious leaders in the North, but problems had 
arisen from time to time.  One of these occasions had been the campaign by the United 
Steelworkers of America (USWA) to organize the Bethlehem Steel company in Buffalo, 
New York.  Initially, local ministers, at the instigation of the company, had come out in 
opposition to the union.  Through the efforts of USWA official, and Presbyterian layman, 
John Ramsay, the CIO had successfully convinced these ministers to change their minds and 
support the union.  The election at Bethlehem was won by the CIO.67  Ramsay continued to 
serve as the USWA’s liaison to the religious community in the capacity of Community 
Relations Director for the union.  Ramsay thus seemed the obvious person to send South, in 
the wake of religious attacks on Operation Dixie, to turn the tide of opposition to the CIO on 
the part of southern ministers.  Ramsay would not be working alone, however.  Joining him 
would be Lucy Randolph Mason, who had served as the CIO’s roving community relations 
representative in the South since the late 1930s.  Mason, a native of Virginia, was herself the 
daughter of an Episcopal minister, and the cousin of a bishop.  Also on the staff of the newly 
formed Community Relations Department was Ruth Gettinger, who was likewise, active in 
religious affairs in the Methodist church.  
67 For an account of this episode, see: Fones-Wolf, Elizabeth and Fones-Wolf, Ken, ”Conversion At Bethlehem: 
Religion and Union Building in Steel, 1930-42, Labor History, Vol. 39, No. 4, 1998, pp. 381-395.
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The initial task facing the CRD was, largely, a reactive one.  Although a proactive 
response, in the form of the establishment of Religion and Labor Fellowship groups would 
come later, and will be discussed in Chapter Three, the initial task was to try to undo the 
damage that had already been done by ministers who claimed that the CIO was an irreligious 
organization that good Christians could not join.  How this goal could be accomplished, 
however, was an interesting question.  Ramsay and his staff could, and did, travel to cities 
where the CIO was conducting an organizing drive in order to speak before the local 
ministerial alliance in order to try to win support for the CIO, but with the small staff 
available to the CRD, this tactic was, perforce, of only limited viability.  Rushing about the 
entire region attempting to counteract attacks on the CIO could quickly consume the entire 
energies of a small office, and assume the character of attempting to stamp out brushfires 
while the whole forest burned.  
The approach taken by the CRD was, ultimately, a more pre-emptive one.  In order to 
attempt to head-off possible religious objections to the CIO before they could be formulated, 
and at the same time to address current critics, the CRD embarked on a publicity campaign. 
The office produced a series of pamphlets, for distribution to ministers, that compiled various 
religious arguments in favor of unions, as well as statements made by denominational bodies 
in favor of worker’s rights to join labor unions.  These pamphlets were then made available 
for distribution to ministers across the South, and more particularly those in communities 
where the CIO hoped to conduct organizing campaigns.  
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Considerable amounts of energy went into producing these pamphlets.  The question 
of worker’s rights to organize was a burning issue during the years immediately preceding 
Operation Dixie, and most of the religious denominations had made some statement on the 
issue during the 1930s and 1940s.  These official statements generally recognized the right of 
worker’s to join unions, and were generally supportive of unions in the abstract.68  The 
Federal Council of Churches, an interfaith body comprising representatives from the major 
mainline Protestant denominations, and a body that had a general reputation for theological 
and social liberalism, had, moreover, made numerous statements in support of organized 
labor over the years.  The task then, for the CRD, was to collect this information and to 
disseminate it throughout the South.  Additionally, some time was devoted to soliciting 
statements in support of the CIO from prominent religious figures as well as researching the 
policies of various religious bodies concerning labor unions.  This work required constant 
updating and revision as new statements were issued, and new endorsements were received, 
and indeed, new versions of these pamphlets were being produced right up through the end of 
Operation Dixie in 1953.
These efforts produced a number of pamphlets, the most notable of which, were 
“Religion Speaks to Labor” and “Labor and Religion.”  The CIO had already received 
statements of support from Reformed Judaism, the Roman Catholic Church, and various 
Mainline Protestant denominations.  “Religion Speaks to Labor” added to these 
pronouncements statements from additional groups, including the Southern Baptist 
68 It should be noted that this was, especially after the passage of the Wagner Act, hardly a courageous or 
extreme stance for denominations to take, considering that recognizing the rights of workers to organize merely 
reflected the realities of federal labor law.
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Convention, the Methodist Church, and the Presbyterian Church, USA.  This was a sound 
decision, as the proportion of the Southern industrial workforce that was either Jewish or 
Roman Catholic was minimal69, and it is unlikely that statements from these two religious 
traditions would have carried much weight with the average Southern worker.70  
Indeed, the religious situation in the South was quite a bit different than that 
prevailing in the North.  While Northern society included sizable, and important, Jewish and 
Roman Catholic populations, the South was notable for its overwhelming Protestantism. 
This Protestantism was not, however, a monolithic unity.  Underneath the broad banner of 
Protestantism teemed literally hundreds of denominations, splinter groups and sects.  The two 
largest denominations in the South were the Southern Baptist and the Methodist churches, 
but in addition to these large denominations were a bewildering array of Free Will, Primitive, 
and Missionary Baptists, Holiness Churches, Pentecostal Churches, Pentecostal Holiness 
Churches, Churches of God, Churches of Christ, and other assorted sects and independent 
congregations.71  
Independence was, in fact, a hallmark of southern religion generally.  The churches of 
the South were, as a rule, much more autonomous and less hierarchically structured than was 
common in the North.  As noted, the Roman Catholic church, with its rigid hierarchy of 
69 The two notable exceptions to this general statement concerning the number of Catholics in the South are the 
states of Louisiana and Kentucky, although it should be noted that these two states were not particularly 
significant in Operation Dixie.
70 Indeed, considering the rampant anti-Semitism and ant-catholic feeling that historically characterized the 
South, endorsements from these groups would probably do more harm than good.  This is a topic that will come 
up again in the discussion in Chapter Three of Religion and Labor Fellowship groups.
71 Odum, Howard, Southern Regions of the United States, University of North Carolina Press, 1936, pp. 141-
149.
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bishops and archbishops, papal bulls, and administration was relatively  small in the South. 
The Episcopal Church, outside of Virginia was a small, and relatively, elite presence.  The 
Presbyterian Church, although more populous than the Catholic or Episcopal denominations, 
was a distant third behind the Baptists and Methodists.  Among the larger denominations in 
the South, the prevailing spirit was one of congregational independence and anti-hierarchical 
autonomy.72  Baptist churches, for example, although they might belong to the Southern 
Baptist Convention, were completely independent bodies, and are in no way bound by the 
proclamations, or decisions of the Convention as a whole.73  Indeed, the independence of the 
local congregation, extending even to the hiring and firing of ministers, was one of the 
traditional hallmarks of the Baptist religion.  Other, smaller, denominations, such as the 
Churches of God, were even more fiercely independent and, of course, independent churches 
and itinerant evangelists were answerable to no one.
What emerges then, is a picture of Southern religion as consisting of a multitude of 
more-or-less independent congregations, headed by fiercely independent ministers who were 
unlikely to be persuaded by arguments from authority.  Unfortunately it was just such an 
argument from authority which the CRD sought to make.  The point, hammered home again 
and again by Ramsay and company, through pamphlets such as “Religion Speaks to Labor,” 
radio addresses, and articles in religious publications was this: that the national councils of 
72 Hill, Samuel S., “A Survey of Southern Religious History,” p. 387, in Religion in the Southern States, Samuel 
S. Hill, ed., Mercer University Press, 1983.
73 It should be noted that this has changed over the past several decades, and churches that are members of the 
Southern Baptist Convention are now a great deal less independent than they were at the time of Operation 
Dixie.  Nonetheless, congregational independence has traditionally been a hallmark of the Baptist 
denomination, and was still the prevailing norm during the 1940s and 1950s.
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the various religious denominations did not oppose labor unions, and thus local 
congregations should, at the very least, stand neutral when the CIO came to town for an 
organizing drive.  
What this approach overlooked, unfortunately, were the very realities of Southern 
religion.  To begin with, there is the factor of church’s very real material interest in the non-
unionization of the South.  Whether the pastor in question was the minister of the church 
where the mill management attended74, or ministered to the mill-village church that was 
subsidized by the owners of the mill, small town Southern pastors were not exactly 
disinterested parties.  Moreover, due to the congregational independence of Southern 
churches, the fact that the national convention had recognized the right of workers to join 
labor unions would likely carry very little weight.  The larger problem, however, was the 
very sources that the CIO was appealing to.  The Federal Council of Churches (later renamed 
the National Council of Churches) had a particularly low reputation among southern religious 
leaders to begin with.  Catholic and Jewish endorsements of organized labor were also 
unlikely to be of much help in the South.  While endorsements from major denominations 
such as the Southern Baptist, Methodist, and Presbyterian were somewhat more helpful, 
these endorsements were often rather vague, generally stating that the denomination in 
question recognized the right of workers to organize and engage in collective bargaining.75 
74 It is perhaps helpful to note that in many denominations, particularly the Southern Baptist, the minister is 
chosen by the congregation, and may be dismissed at their pleasure.  This, of course, stands in marked contrast 
to the norm in more hierarchical churches, such as the Roman Catholic, or Episcopal denominations, where the 
priest is answerable to a bishop, rather than the parish.  This fact no doubt caused many ministers to feel 
somewhat constrained when it came to taking positions that might not be popular with their congregations.
75 “Religion Speaks to Labor,” Folder titled “Religion,” Box 53, John Ramsay Papers.
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While such an endorsement could be read as approving the CIO, it could just as easily be 
read as endorsing unionism generally, but not the CIO specifically.  Ministers could, and did, 
insist that local unions were allowable, but national unions were not permissible. 
Alternatively, a minister could admit that some unions were acceptable, but that the CIO was 
unacceptable because of its associations with communism, violence, strikes, racial policies, 
etc.  Finally, these statements were made by national or regional bodies, and did not always 
reflect the sentiments and beliefs of the local community.  While a national convention might 
recognize the right of workers to join unions, it is clear that many local representatives of 
those bodies did not, and further, that they felt no compulsion to accept the national 
convention’s declarations as binding.  Given the noted independence of Southern clergy, this 
is not particularly surprising.  Given that very real material, economic, interests were often at 
stake, it approaches naivete to expect that ministers, hostile to organized labor, would 
suddenly accept the CIO with open arms simply because the national convention of their 
denomination had passed a resolution acknowledging the legal right of workers to join a 
union.  
Unfortunately, for the CIO, naivete seemed to be the dominant characteristic of the 
CRD during Operation Dixie.  For all of the experience that Ramsay, Mason, and company 
had of the South, for all that they seemed to be well aware of the fact that ministers often had 
an economic interest in preventing unionization, they still proceeded as if they could 
convince religious leaders to change sides if only they could present them with enough 
information.  The CRD’s vision for how this plan would work is laid out in a pamphlet 
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written by Dave Burgess, a Congregationalist minister and CIO organizer in Rock Hill, S.C., 
who worked closely with the CRD office.  In “Unions and Preachers,” Burgess tells a 
fictional tale of an organizing drive in a small mill town.  The characters in this morality play 
are the union organizer, Pat Jones, the millhand, Fred Styles, the young, liberal minister Joe 
Black, and the older, established minister Rev. Rogers.  Reverend Rogers is the minister of 
the uptown church attended by the mill owner, and is, initially, opposed to the union 
organizing drive.76  
Pat Jones is in the midst of an organizing campaign that is proceeding slowly, and 
meeting with opposition from the mill management.  Fred, the millhand, seems to be 
interested in the union, but is concerned that joining a union might violate his religious 
beliefs.  These concerns are worsened by a revivalist named Smith, who we later learn has 
been hired by the mill owner to preach against the union.  In order to allay Fred’s concerns, 
Pat Jones gives him a “little pamphlet,” telling him that it is a “statement on how the 
denominations stand of labor questions.”  Although the pamphlet is not named in the story, it 
is probably safe to assume that it was a copy of the CIO’s “Religion Speaks to Labor.”77  
After looking over the pamphlet, Fred is still confused and uncertain about what to 
think.  On the one hand, the pamphlet that Jones gave him seems to imply that unions have 
the blessings of the Church.  On the other hand, he has been told by Evangelist Smith that 
Christianity and labor unions are incompatible.  Unable to decide what he thinks about the 
issue, Fred goes to see the preacher at the “millhand’s church,” the young Rev. Black.  To 
76 “Unions and Preachers,” Folder titled “Religion,” Box 53, John Ramsay Papers.
77 Ibid.
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Fred’s evident surprise, Rev. Black agrees with the union organizer and unreservedly defends 
the need for labor unions.  Reverend Black points out that Jesus loved the poor, and was 
despised by the rich, and rebuts Fred’s concerns about kindness and brotherhood among 
Christians by stating “sure, be Christian.  Kindness, however, must go with justice and 
equality.  It’s not right for you to be getting 30 cents an hour and your family going hungry 
while the company is making fat profits.”78  
Evidently convinced by Rev. Black and the union pamphlet, Fred proceeds to join the 
union.  Meanwhile, organizer Jones and Rev. Black get together to discuss the situation in 
town.  Black complains that ministers are opposing the union, citing Rev. Rogers as an 
obstacle to his organizing efforts.  Keen to be of help to the union, Rev. Black arranges a 
meeting between Rogers and the Jones, where the two experience a true meeting of the 
minds, and Rev. Rogers is converted to a champion of industrial unionism.  Rogers proceeds 
to go to the mill to meet with his Sunday School superintendent, the mill owner, and 
convinces him to cease opposing the union and recognize the new local, which has, 
meanwhile, elected Fred as its first president.  There is a happy ending in which labor and 
management are reconciled, Evangelist Smith is summarily fired by the mill owner, and “a 
new era in millville” begins.79
This is, evidently, what the CIO hoped would be the result of the CRD’s outreach 
efforts.  As a dream scenario, it’s not bad.  If, on the other hand, this is what the CRD really 
expected to occur, they were, undoubtedly, extremely disappointed.  As it happened, this was 
78 Ibid.
79 Ibid.
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not the usual turn of events during Operation Dixie.  There were a few “Reverend Blacks” to 
be sure; young, idealistic clergy fresh out of seminary who held liberal views concerning 
economics and labor unions.  That there were very many post-conversion “Reverend Rogers” 
figures, on the other hand, is exceedingly unlikely.  
During the course of Operation Dixie, there was no massive change of heart among 
the ministers of the South.  For whatever reason, whether they were unconvinced by the 
theological arguments put forth by the CRD, or because they were bought and paid for by the 
industrialists of southern industry, ministers continued to oppose the CIO, and champions of 
labor did not emerge in any significant numbers from among the ministers of the South.  The 
CIO retained some ministerial support, but this came chiefly from its established allies – 
Roman Catholic clergy, rabbis, and a few liberal ministers from among the mainline 
Protestant denominations.  This latter group tended to be young, idealistic, and recently 
graduated from seminary.  Moreover, the CIO failed to make any real inroads among the 
group which most vociferously opposed them, and whose support might make the most 
difference, namely the working-class preachers from non-mainline denominations, who 
tended to be clustered in ministries which catered to mill-workers.  
Ironically, this group of ministers, whose congregations were most likely to contain a 
high percentage of workers eligible for membership in the CIO, was viewed with a fair 
amount of suspicion and distaste by union leaders.  The CIO’s pamphlet “Labor and 
Religion,” for example warned of “thousands of misguided cultist ministers,” who “work 
side by side with those they would influence, or preach from churches located in working 
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class neighborhoods.”  The same publication lamented the fact that “unfortunately, most 
socially enlightened, formally trained young ministers locate in middle-class communities, 
far from the centers of the greatest need.”  While denouncing “cultist ministers” as not 
representing “true religion,” the pamphlet argued that, rather than seeking to work with the 
materials at hand and win over the misguided, that the answer lay in the future.  “Religious 
seminaries should train their best men to serve industrial workers,” the pamphlet declared, 
leaving the issue of what to do in the meantime somewhat vague.80  
This dismissive, and strangely, for the CIO, elitist attitude towards working class 
religion, seemed to characterize the outreach activities of the CRD during Operation Dixie. 
The CIO had the support of religious liberals, the Catholic church, and some segments of 
Judaism.  None of these groups were particularly well represented in the South.  What the 
CIO needed was religious support from local leaders with influence in the southern 
communities in which they were organizing.  This support could come, potentially, from 
basically two main sources – mainline Protestant ministers, whether they be Southern 
Baptists, Methodists, or Presbyterians, or from smaller, non-mainline sects, such as the 
Holiness churches, the Pentecostals, or the Assemblies of God.  What appears to have 
happened is this: the CRD largely wrote off the smaller, more working class organizations as 
a hopeless cause, and chose to focus on larger denominations which had gone on record as 
supporting some version of worker’s rights to join labor unions.81  
80 “Labor and Religion,” Folder titled “Religion,” Box 53, John Ramsay Papers.
81 This was a particularly unfortunate decision on the part of the CRD, considering that many of the workers that 
they were seeking to organize were members of these smaller, non-mainline, sects.  Although membership data 
is difficult to find, Liston Pope’s study of Gastonia, Millhands and Preachers, found that in the textile town of 
Gastonia, North Carolina, in 1939, sectarian churches, such as the Pentecostal Holiness and Church of God, 
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Whether this was a conscious decision, or simply the way that events worked out, is 
difficult to determine.  The CRD certainly did not go out of its way to antagonize the smaller 
sects, but neither did it devote a great deal of effort to cultivating them.  A revealing incident 
in this regard occurred in July of 1947, when Dave Burgess, a CIO organizer based in Rock 
Hill, S.C. who worked closely with Ramsay, received a letter from G.H. Montgomery of the 
Publishing House of the Pentecostal Holiness Church.  Montgomery wrote to Burgess after 
seeing an article in Textile Labor concerning Burgess and his work for the CIO. 
Montgomery requested that Burgess answer a few questions concerning his religious views 
on such basic issues as the authority of the Bible, the resurrection, the second coming, the 
existence of heaven and hell, the existence of a personal God, and the existence of the devil. 
None of the questions related to labor issues, and were, presumably, intended to determine 
Burgess’ orthodoxy, or lack thereof.82  Montgomery included a pre-addressed, stamped 
envelope, and requested that Burgess reply at his convenience.  Rather than accepting this as 
a valuable opportunity to enter into dialogue with a representative of the Pentecostal Holiness 
Church, a denomination that was popular among mill workers, Burgess chose to ignore the 
letter completely.  In a letter to John Ramsay, Burgess explained that he based this decision 
on the fact that “when in Union Seminary [Union Theological Seminary in New York City] I 
made a thorough study of the Pentecostal Holiness Church, and I found that it was viciously 
accounted for 36 out of a total of 83 churches predominantly attended by mill workers, and found, moreover, 
that the sectarian churches were rapidly expanding in membership.  See Pope, Liston, Millhands and 
Preachers, pp. 98-103, particularly tables XIX and XXV.  What this suggests is that, in choosing to ignore the 
smaller non-mainline sects, the CRD was, effectively, ignoring a religious community that included a larger 
percentage of the workers that the CIO was hoping to organize.
82 G.H. Montgomery to Dave Burgess, July 22, 1947.  Folder 151, Box 1568, John Ramsay Papers.
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anti-labor in doctrine.”  Burgess noted that he had consulted with Franz Daniel (the director 
for Operation Dixie in South Carolina,) and Don McKee (another CIO organizer working in 
South Carolina with Burgess,) and that both men concurred with his decision.83 Considering 
that the purpose of the CRD was, in theory, to neutralize anti-labor sentiment in the religious 
community, this was a strange position to take to say the least.  Unfortunately, this decision 
to write off influential opponents to the CIO, while focusing on those who were already 
sympathetic, albeit unable to be of much help, was far from uncommon.
In a way, the decision to focus on mainline Protestant clergy made a certain amount 
of sense.  These denominations were, after all, formally on record as acknowledging union’s 
right to exist and this, at least, was a start.  The situation among non-mainline Protestant 
churches was somewhat less clear.  In a special, condensed, version of “Religion Speaks to 
Labor” published in the December, 1950 edition of The Witness, John Ramsay and Lucy 
Randolph Mason wrote that “we have not been able to discover any church among the 
Holiness, Pentecostal, and Church of God groups that forbids its members to join unions.” 
For a section devoted exclusively to the Pentecostal Holiness Church, Ramsay and Mason 
noted that the church, in its “Discipline of the Pentecostal Holiness Church” published in 
1945, expressly permitted its members to join labor unions, and excluded unions from its ban 
on “oathbound secret societies, social clubs, and corrupt partisan politics, etc.”84  While 
perhaps not a ringing endorsement, these positions hardly justified the outright dismissal that 
Burgess accorded the church.
83 Dave Burgess to John Ramsay, August 7, 1947, Folder 151, Box 1568, John Ramsay Papers.
84 Ramsay, John, and Mason, Lucy, “Religion Speaks to Labor,” The Witness, December 28, 1950, p. 8.
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Nonetheless, it is somewhat understandable, and perhaps even to be expected, that the 
CRD largely chose not to focus its efforts on these groups.  Ramsay, Mason, and Burgess 
were all members of mainline Protestant denominations themselves, and had ample 
experience in their churches.  They had all, moreover, had first hand experience in bringing 
together religious leaders of their denominations and union officials for the purpose of 
cooperation.  It probably seemed likely to them that they could do so again in the context of 
Operation Dixie.  On the other hand, none of the members of the CRD, or the organizers they 
worked closely with, were, themselves, members of non-mainline evangelical churches. 
Working with Baptists or Methodists probably seemed the safer proposition, and this is, by 
and large, the one that they pursued.  
What opportunities were lost in not working more closely with charismatics and 
sectarian evangelicals is, of course, hard to measure.  Perhaps nothing would have come of it. 
What is certain, however, is that these groups counted among their congregations many of 
the workers that the CIO was attempting to organize.  These workers, moreover, were 
unlikely to be swayed by the endorsements of ministers from “uptown” churches or mainline 
denominations, who commonly looked down upon, and shunned, Pentecostals and members 
of other sects.  Relations between mainline and non-mainline Protestant denominations were 
not always cordial, and so it is doubtful whether the ministers the CRD was targeting would 
have been of much help with this group, even had they been persuaded to support the CIO.  
Of course, these ministers were not, en masse, persuaded.  Opposition to the CIO on 
the part of religious leaders was not noticeably weaker at the end of Operation Dixie than it 
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had been at the campaign’s beginning.  This should not be particularly surprising.  Ministers, 
as much as anyone else, are a product of their time and their culture.  The culture of the 
South, at the time of Operation Dixie, was vehemently pro-business and anti-union. 
Ministers, moreover, tended to be solidly middle class in terms of both economics and of 
social standing and prestige.  In a uniquely religious region, ministers were highly respected 
and valued members of their communities and, as such, had a very real stake in maintaining 
the status quo.  Ministers were invested in the prevailing social situation of the South and, 
lacking solid reasons to support social change, reasons far more compelling than vaguely 
worded endorsements of organized labor promulgated at a national level by their 
denominations, were extremely unlikely to sign on in support of wholesale economic and 
social upheaval.  
This chapter began with a vignette from Hogansville, Georgia at the start of 
Operation Dixie, and it is perhaps appropriate to end it here with another scene, also from 
Georgia, but this time from the small town of Hazlehurst, from the year 1952, the year before 
Operation Dixie formally came to an end.  During the summer of 1952, a CIO organizer 
named John Scott was working to organize the Cook Lumber Company in Hazlehurst.  As 
the campaign moved forward, John Ramsay was called in to assist Scott by meeting with the 
local ministers to explain the CIO’s position and solicit their help.  Things seemed to be 
proceeding well, according to accounts, “considerable headway had been made,” despite 
opposition from the local business community.85  
85 Labor Letter, September 12, 1952, Folder titled “Religion,” Box 53, John Ramsay Papers.
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Then, on July 31st, Scott was attacked by company guards while distributing literature 
at the plan gates.  Later that day, Ramsay and Bill Strength, a labor singer who sometimes 
worked with Ramsay, went down to the plant to continue leafleting for an upcoming union 
meeting.  They too were attacked by “seven men who had gathered on the other side of the 
main gate.”  Bleeding from their wounds, the two men fled the scene and went to look for 
help.  While looking for aid, they found that “the Mayor of the town was ‘absent,’ the 
sheriff’s office ‘empty,’ & a police car ‘unmanned.”86  
The events of the 31st occurred on a Thursday.  Two days later on Saturday a “mob of 
50 men gathered outside of the hotel to renew their threats against the organizers.  The CIO 
men were compelled to flee the town.”  Evidently not as much headway had been made as 
the union organizers had hoped.  This sort of occurrence was common enough, in and of 
itself, during Operation Dixie, but what makes this scene of organizers run out of town 
interesting for our purposes is the comment made by Francis McPeek in his account of the 
incident for Labor Letter.  McPeek observed that “the shocking thing has been the failure of 
the ministers & churches to condemn the outrageous incident.”87
By 1953, Ramsay and the CRD had invested seven years in attempting to change the 
hearts and minds of the religious leaders of the South.  Pamphlets, newspaper articles, radio 
addresses, and countless personal speaking appearances had been made throughout the South 
attempting to win the support of southern religious leaders.  In the case of Hazlehurst, 
Ramsay had personally met with the local ministers and explained the CIO’s purpose and 
86 Ibid.
87 Ibid.
62
goals in their community.  After all of this effort, the CIO was still being run out of small 
southern towns, while prominent industrialists broke the law with official approval.  After all 
of this effort, the churches still stood silent when called upon to speak out in favor of the 
union.  After all of this effort, the churches still remained silent in the face of violent 
repression and flagrant criminal behavior.                                   
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Chapter Four: Walking Together
The previous chapter examined the reactive efforts of the Community Relations 
Department to address hostility towards the CIO and Operation Dixie, but there was another 
side to the CRD’s program in the South.  There was also a proactive side to the department’s 
community outreach efforts, and that program will be examined in this chapter.  While 
attempting to answer the critics of organized labor was obviously a top priority, the CRD also 
sought to pre-empt criticism by courting religious leaders at the outset of an organizing 
campaign, before they had taken any firm position, for or against the union.  This work 
usually consisted of informal visits, usually made by either John Ramsay or Lucy Randolph 
Mason, to local ministers in order to explain the CIO’s position and to allay any concerns 
which minister’s might have about CIO activities in their communities.  These informal visits 
laid the groundwork for more formal organization later, with the ultimate objective being the 
formation of local Religion and Labor Fellowship groups.  These groups brought local 
ministers and union officials together for luncheon discussions in which issues could be 
discussed and, ideally, some measure of mutual understanding could be achieved.  
The motivating idea behind this concept was Ramsay’s conviction that many of the 
differences between organized labor and organized religion were rooted in a mutual lack of 
knowledge and understanding.  Many union members were alienated from the churches, or, if 
they attended, chose to keep their union membership secret, for fear that they would be 
stigmatized for their membership in a labor union.  Similarly, Ramsay believed that many 
ministers simply were uninformed about labor issues, and did not really understand the 
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purposes and goals of organized labor.  Fellowship groups, then, would serve as a forum for 
both sides to air their grievances, address their misperceptions, and move forward, united by 
common understanding and Christian brotherhood.  At least, that was the way things were 
supposed to work out.
While this scenario may, at first blush, seem a bit naive, Ramsay had some reason to 
think it might work during Operation Dixie.  Religion and Labor Fellowship groups were the 
flagship program of the National Religion and Labor Foundation, an organization with which 
Ramsay was very familiar, having served for many years on its Executive Board.  The 
National Religion and Labor Foundation had been founded in 1931 by liberals within the 
Protestant religious community in order to solicit support for the labor movement. 
According to Elizabeth Fones-Wolf, the NRLF failed to gain much interest from within the 
ranks of the AFL, but “quickly attracted labor leaders from the ranks of the CIO.  Over the 
years, members of the Foundation’s Executive Board included such CIO leaders as Van 
Bittner, James B. Carey, Walter Reuther, Joseph Bierne, and David McDonald.”88  The 
NRLF enjoyed some degree of success and influence in the North, boasting "active chapters 
in the principal cities,”89 and the Religion and Labor Fellowship Group model had worked 
successfully in a number of situations including the Bethlehem strike with which Ramsay 
was involved in Buffalo, New York.  
As a result of the demonstrated success of the Religion and Labor Fellowship model 
in the North, Ramsay evidently felt that this plan could be successfully transplanted to the 
88 Fones-Wolf, Elizabeth, Selling Free Enterprise, University of Illinois Press, 1994, pg. 230.
89 “The Churches and the Labor Movement,” in Social Action Newsletter, September, 1948, Folder titled 
“Religion,” Box 53, John Ramsay Papers.  
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South during the course of Operation Dixie.  While the pamphlets produced by the CRD 
would serve as a forum in which to counter criticism, the fellowship groups could serve as a 
way to pre-empt criticism by making friends and forming alliances.  The CIO was acutely 
aware of the role that ministers could play in either aiding or obstructing a strike or 
organizing campaign in their community, and thus it was thought to be of paramount 
importance by the CRD for ministers to be informed of both labor’s overall goals and 
program, as well as labor issues in their own cities.  If the CIO could gain the goodwill of 
local ministers, perhaps even their assistance in their organizing efforts, the task of 
organizing the South would be made noticeably easier.  Even if all that was accomplished 
was inducing ministers to remain neutral in contests between labor and capital, the potential 
benefit would be substantial.  
The first step to forming a Religion and Labor Fellowship group was to locate 
interested ministers.  In the South, this was not as easy a task as might be thought.  The usual 
approach was for either Lucy Mason or John Ramsay to visit a community in which the CIO 
was beginning an organizational drive and call on the local ministers, trying to sound them 
out in order to gauge sympathy and locate likely supporters.  These visits were typically 
followed by a request to address the local ministerial alliance on the topic of organized labor 
and its aims.  In these talks, Ramsay tried to reassure the ministers that the CIO was a 
responsible labor union, led by sober, religious men who sought simple justice for their 
members, and social stability for the country.  Ramsay also took this opportunity to address 
misconceptions concerning unions that clergy might hold, rebutting charges of communism 
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and violence.  If this initial presentation went well, a RLF luncheon group might 
subsequently be formed.
  In a 1947 article describing the formation and functioning of a fellowship group in 
Ohio, written for the magazine Prophetic Religion, John Ramsay expressed his confidence in 
the ultimate success of the RLF model in the South.  In describing the Ohio group, Ramsay 
wrote that “it could be Columbus, Georgia, although this story is of Columbus, Ohio…The 
same kind of story is now in the making in Columbus, Georgia, and many other southern 
towns and cities.”90  Unfortunately for Ramsay, this statement was overly optimistic. 
Columbus, Georgia was not Columbus, Ohio, and RLF groups never achieved the same 
success in the South that they had in the North.  Indeed, there is a certain irony in the 
comparison, considering that Columbus, Georgia was the hometown and base of operations 
for Parson Jack Johnson, the publisher of the viciously anti-labor publication The Gospel  
Trumpet, which routinely attacked labor unions generally, and the CIO particularly, as anti-
Christian organizations to which no god-fearing man could properly belong.  
Despite a busy schedule of engagements, which included hundreds of speaking 
appearances before ministerial alliances throughout the South, Ramsay was never quite able 
to achieve his vision of Religion and Labor Fellowship Groups sprouting up in “towns and 
cities” throughout the South.  While ministers often gave him a polite reception, and perhaps 
a few vague, if sympathetic comments, some met his advances with outright hostility, and 
others conveniently arranged to be unavailable when he called on them.  As it turned out, it 
90 “Religion, Labor, and Social Action,” Prophetic Religion, Summer, 1947, Folder title “Religion,” Box 53, 
John Ramsay Papers.
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was one thing to gain a polite hearing at a personal appointment, or even to be invited to 
speak at a ministerial alliance meeting, but quite another, and more difficult task, to convince 
ministers to actually take the step of forming a fellowship group.  When things got past the 
point of mere talk, and proceeded to the plane of action, many ministers proved unwilling to 
take on an active role.  Whether out of sincere conviction, unwillingness to take on 
controversial issues, or outright antagonism to labor, many clergy professed an unwillingness 
to get involved in labor issues.  A common explanation for minister’s reluctance to form a 
fellowship group was that they felt that the role of the church was to stand neutral in contests 
between capital and labor, that the role of the church was to attend to spiritual, rather than 
material, matters.  Other ministers, who had proved friendly enough when the issue was 
merely one of talk, proved decidedly less friendly when called upon to actually take action.  
By the end of Operation Dixie, the CRD had managed to form a mere nineteen RLF 
groups throughout the entire region.91  Of these groups, several were located in major cities 
such as Atlanta, well outside of the major textile areas that were targeted by Operation Dixie. 
Among the groups that were formed, it is difficult to gauge whether any of these groups 
contributed substantially to the CIO’s organizing efforts.  Certainly, organizing did not go 
well during the campaign, and religious opposition to the CIO, as noted previously, was not 
noticeably less at the end of Operation Dixie than it had been at the start.  No doubt this lack 
of results stems from the simple scarcity of fellowship groups, but in part the explanation 
probably lies in the nature of the groups’ activities.
91 Fones-Wolf, Elizabeth, Selling Free Enterprise, University of Illinois Press, 1994, pg. 229.
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Although the CRD hoped that fellowship groups would ultimately result in greater 
activism on the part of clergy, and Economic Justice, the newsletter of the National Religion 
and Labor Foundation requested its members to “support strikes, to write senators and 
congressmen in support of favorable legislation, and to communicate the concerns of the 
labor movement to their congregations,”92 the actual activities of the RLF groups were 
mostly educational.  Representatives from organized labor, or sympathetic organizations, 
would speak at luncheons on various topics such as minimum wage laws, or the role of the 
churches in society.  A free lunch and an uplifting talk on general principles do not an 
organized, involved corps of activist clergy make.
Another problem with the implementation of the RLF program had to do with the 
makeup of its membership.  On the one hand, simply finding enough interested ministers to 
start an RLF group could be a daunting task indeed, and to a certain extent the CRD 
obviously had to work with the materials at hand.  On the other hand, the clergy recruited by 
a local RLF group tended to reflect the CIO’s natural base in the religious community, not 
necessarily those ministers who could be most helpful to the union’s cause.  Thus, for 
instance, the CRD could usually count on recruiting the local Catholic priest, perhaps the 
local rabbi, if there happened to be one in the community in question, and a handful of liberal 
Protestants.  While the moral support supplied by these clergy was, no doubt, heartening, 
their congregations did not usually contain many of the workers who the CIO was trying to 
enlist, and their influence in the community tended to be accordingly small.  The largest 
92 Abrams, Brian, John Ramsay and the Evolution of Church Labor Relations in the CIO, Masters Thesis, 
Georgia State University, 1985, pg. 82.
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denomination in the South, by far, was the Southern Baptist, followed by Methodists.93 
Although breakdowns of denominational membership by economic class and occupation are 
difficult to locate, it is clear from contemporary reports that these denominations were also in 
the majority among industrial workers.94  Further, it should be noted, that smaller, more 
evangelical sects were also popular among working class southerners, particularly those 
employed in the textile industry.95  If the Religion and Labor Fellowship groups established 
by the CRD were to have any significant influence in supporting organized labor, it would 
have been important to draw its constituents from these denominational groupings.  There 
was, moreover, also a class dynamic at work.  Southern religion, as a whole, was highly 
stratified by class.96  Episcopalians, for example, tended to be of a higher social and 
economic class than, say, Baptists.  Mainline Protestants, as a whole, tended to be higher 
class than members of evangelical sects.  Within the mainline denominations themselves, 
moreover, there was stratification depending on what sector of the community the individual 
church catered to.  For instance, there were “uptown” Baptist, Methodist, and Presbyterian 
93 Howard Odum found that “of the more than 4,000,000 white adult members of Protestant churches in the 
Southeast, nearly 2,500,000 belong to the Southern Baptist Convention and a little over 1,500,000 to the 
General Conference of the Methodist Episcopal Church, South.”  Odum, Southern Regions of the United States, 
p. 141.
94 This observation is also supported by Liston Pope’s findings in the community of Gastonia, North Carolina 
where, out of a total of 83 “mill churches” in the community, the Baptist denomination accounted for 27 
churches, and the Methodists claimed another 11, for a total of 38, or nearly half of the churches which were 
predominantly attended by mill workers.  Pope, Millhands and Preachers, p. 103.
95 See footnote 80.
96 For a discussion of this phenomenon, see Pope, Millhands and Preachers, pp. 96-116.  Pope’s findings 
indicated that “wide social differences appeared between Presbyterians and Methodists, Lutherans and Baptists, 
with each denomination becoming especially identified with one (or at most two) of the emerging social classes. 
When the older religious traditions proved too inflexible to meet needs arising from novel social situations, new 
sects arose to fill the gaps: the Church of God, the Wesleyan Methodists, the Pentecostal Holiness Church, and 
other neoteric cults.” p. 96.
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churches, that tended to cater to white collar workers, including bankers, clerks, lawyers, and 
mill managers.  At the other end of the spectrum, there were mill churches, often subsidized 
by companies, that ministered to the employees who lived in mill villages, or in working 
class residential areas.  
Thus, in order for a minister to be an effective advocate for the CIO, not only would 
he have to be of the right denomination, but also from the right socio-economic strata within 
that denomination.  While a Baptist minister whose congregation consisted of mill workers 
would be an ideal ally for the CIO, an uptown Baptist minister, whose congregation excluded 
mill workers (presuming of course that he could be convinced to support the union) would 
likely be much less influential among the workers.  
Of course, by and large, uptown ministers did not support the CIO.  Many opted 
instead to remain neutral, and many who did choose to get involved did so on the side of 
employers.97  This might not have been very significant, had the CIO been able to marshal its 
own supporters from the ranks of the mill village clergy, but this seldom happened.  As was 
noted in the previous chapter, the CRD tended to be mistrustful of the sects, viewing them as 
predisposed to anti-labor views, uneducated as to the social and economic issues, and 
generally unreliable.  While this was perhaps true in many cases, the Pentecostal, Holiness, 
and Church of God ministers were, nonetheless, influential leaders within their communities, 
and could have, if successfully cultivated, significantly aided in the work of organization.  
97 “In November 1951, Ramsay admitted that most religious leaders in the South were ‘still skeptical of the 
labor movement, if not opposed to it.” Elizabeth Fones-Wolf, Selling Free Labor, pg. 229.
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There were a number of factors at work here.  On the theological plane, southern 
Protestantism tended to be much less concerned with society, than with the relationship 
between the individual believer and God.  The Social Gospel had not made deep inroads in 
the South, and religion in the region tended to be much more personal and spiritual than was 
the norm in other parts of the country.98  This focus, in turn, led to a somewhat otherworldly 
view of the role of religion.  If the world was corrupt, wicked, and plagued by a variety of 
social evils, the role of the church was to bring salvation to the individual and point the way 
towards a better day in the afterlife, rather than leading the way in social reform in the here 
and now.  This tendency ran throughout southern religion, but was particularly noticeable in 
the non-mainline, evangelical sects.  Broadly speaking, these denominations did not see their 
role as one of social involvement, and the idea of getting involved in labor disputes seemed 
both foreign and inappropriate.99  
There existed also what might be termed a counter-cultural element to sectarian 
Protestantism.  Members of these churches saw themselves as a people apart, uniquely 
sanctified and justified, separate from and apart from the common mass of sinners.  This 
mass of sinners, it should be noted, often encompassed members of mainline denominations 
who were seen as corrupt, worldly, and insincere Christians, who compromised their faith by 
98 Hill, “A Survey of Southern Religious History,” pp. 396-7.
99 In the course of his analysis of the sermons preached by ministers in Gastonia, Liston Pope noted that “there 
is much emphasis on the saving power of ‘the blood of Jesus,’ and continual admonition to follow the ‘Jesus 
way.’  There is almost never any direct application of these admonitions to practical problems of economic life; 
when it is made, references to such virtues as kindliness, forgiveness, and honesty comprise the net result.” 
Pope, Millhands and Preachers, p. 177.   
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participating in the larger society.100  This fact could, and did, work against the CIO, in that 
many ministers from these sects tended to remain unconcerned with social issues, and if the 
subject came up, were quite capable of telling their congregations not to concern themselves 
with such matters but instead to focus on God and the life to come.
However, the latent anti-systemic trend in sectarian evangelical religion could cut 
both ways.  It is but a small step from denouncing the sinfulness of the world in general, to 
denouncing the sinfulness of laissez-faire capitalism run amok.  The evangelical sects had no 
particular respect for wealth, and tended to regard the poor as both virtuous and oppressed. 
The prophetic books of the Old Testament with their ringing denunciation of those who 
profited through the oppression of the weak resonated particularly well with sectarian 
theology.  Perhaps most importantly, non-mainline, evangelical ministers were low status 
outsiders with regard to the southern religious establishment.  Pentecostal or Holiness 
preachers were not regarded with the same respect and esteem as were their Baptist or 
Methodist brethren, and thus had much less of a stake in preserving southern society as it 
was.  If the clergy of these denominations were not natural allies for the CIO, then they were, 
at the very least, potential allies.  This potential, however, was largely unrealized during the 
course of Operation Dixie.
This leeriness of smaller Protestant sects fits well with the overall pre-occupation of 
Operation Dixie’s planners with presenting the union as a mainstream, non-radical, and, 
above all, respectable organization that posed no threat to the overall social structure.  This 
100 Hill, Samuel, S., and Mead, Frank, S. Handbook of Denominations in the United States, Abingdon Press, 
2001, p. 162.
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approach, as has been previously noted, did not square particularly well with the objectives 
of Operation Dixie.  Had the South been fully organized, working-class people brought into 
electoral politics, and wages brought up to northern standards, southern society would have 
been drastically changed.  Existing power structures, both economic and political, would 
have been overturned.  In order for this to occur, however, traditional sources of influence 
and authority would have had to be challenged, and this is precisely what the CRD, and the 
CIO as a whole, failed to do.  Instead, the CRD attempted to present the CIO as a sober, 
“responsible,” organization that would insure stability and not upset the status quo.  Whether 
this approach was deluded or disingenuous does not matter so much as the ultimate fact that 
southern religious leaders simply did not buy it.  The CRD could talk all it wanted to of 
promoting Christian brotherhood, understanding between the classes, and the similarity 
between the purposes of organized labor and Christianity, but southern clergy, for the most 
part, were simply not convinced.  Instead, they saw the CIO, correctly it might be added, as a 
divisive force whose agenda, if fulfilled, would upset the economic, racial, and social 
structure of southern society and, in the process, challenge their own standing within it.  
In order to understand how this process worked, it might be helpful to present a case 
study in frustration: the CRD’s attempt to form a Religion and Labor Fellowship in the 
textile town of Anderson, South Carolina.  The CRD tried, over a period from 1947 to 1950, 
to gain a foothold in Anderson, without any appreciable success.  The CRD’s involvement 
began when John Ramsay made a visit to Anderson “in the spring of 1947… as a matter of 
routine.”  Initially, things seemed to go well.  The head of the Ministerial Association was 
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out of town, but Ramsay was able to meet with the Chairman of the Association’s Program 
Committee.  Apparently this meeting went well, for the ministers voted at their April meeting 
to invite Ramsay to come and speak to them at their May monthly meeting.101
Ramsay spoke to the ministers on May 5, 1947, and reported that he received a “very 
cordial reception from the ministers,” who “continued to question me after my address for 
about one and one-half hours.”  Although the ministers had received him politely enough, 
they were apparently unready to commit just yet to support for the CIO.  As a follow up to 
the May 5th meeting, Ramsay received a letter from the Ministerial Association of May 30th, 
thanking him for his appearance, but, significantly, adding that “I think another meeting to 
hear a representative of the manufacturers would be interesting.  Ministers should be 
informed of all currents of thought and actions about us.”102  
The letter also contained a clipping from the Anderson Daily Mail of May 19, 1947, 
which reported the Ministerial Association Meeting at which John Ramsay had spoken.  The 
newspaper article reported that “the organizers would, indeed, gain a point if they could 
induce ministers to regard the CIO as a ‘missionary’ effort, and could line up pastors, either 
individually, or as a group, back of the movement.”  However, the report was confident that 
this would not occur, stating that “knowing Southern ministers as we do, we predict that the 
CIO organizers and leaders will have even less success in lining up ministerial support than 
they have had in convincing cotton mill employees that the CIO is the implement that will 
101 “Testimony of Mr. John G. Ramsay, Community Relations Director, CIO Organizing Committee, of 
Personal Experience in Anderson, S.C.,” Folder 155, Box 1568, John Ramsay Papers.
102 Ibid.
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bring about an industrial millenium in the South.”  Unfortunately for the CRD, this prediction 
proved to be correct.103
After this episode, the CRD’s efforts in Anderson were, apparently, put on hold for 
some time.  In the Fall of 1949, Ramsay renewed his outreach efforts in Anderson by mailing 
a letter to various “civic and religious leaders” in Anderson, detailing the Community 
Relations Department’s program.  Clergymen were also mailed copies of two pamphlets, 
“The Church and the CIO Together,” and “The Community Depends on Wages.”  This 
correspondence was followed by a personal visit by Ramsay to Anderson, during which he 
met with the Mayor, the head of the Chamber of Commerce, and the head of the Ministerial 
Association.  At none of these meetings did Ramsay receive what might be called a warm 
welcome.  The Executive Secretary of the Chamber of Commerce, E.W. Meeks, was perhaps 
most blunt, informing Ramsay that “the CIO is not welcome in our community, and my 
advice to you is to take your people and leave immediately while you can leave peacefully.” 
The mayor informed Ramsay of his intention to maintain “law and order in our 
community.”104  
Ramsay’s meeting with Reverend W. G. Newman, the President of the Anderson 
Ministerial Association, serves as an excellent illustration of the ways in which Southern 
ministers avoided involvement with the CRD.  Evidently too polite to simply inform Ramsay 
that he had no intention of supporting the CIO in Anderson, Rev. Newman nonetheless 
managed to convey his position.  After politely receiving Ramsay at his home, Rev. Newman 
103 Ibid.
104 Ibid.
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complemented him on his address two years prior, and conceded that, upon researching the 
position of the Methodist Church on the issue of labor unions, he had found that the church 
did, indeed, recognize worker’s right to organize.  However, the Reverend hastened to add, 
“that this meant local unions and not the CIO.”  Ramsay, naturally, argued this point, asking 
if “he felt that local management was sinning in joining the Chamber of Commerce which is 
a National Association of Management.”  Reverend Newman’s reply is not recorded, but it 
seems doubtful that he was persuaded by Ramsay’s argument.105
Perhaps as a way of shifting the discussion, Reverend Newman stated that “Anderson 
would not tolerate John L. Lewis in their community.”  Ramsay, quite correctly, pointed out 
that Mr. Lewis had not headed the CIO in quite some time, and asked what Lewis had to do 
with the CIO’s drive in Anderson.  Rev. Newman “said that Mr. Lewis was the President of 
the CIO,” and, when corrected, “said that he was President of all the unions.”  Ramsay tried 
to address this misconception, pointing out that “Mr. Lewis was President of a great 
international union, the United Mine Workers of America, which is an independent union.” 
Reverend Newman, however, was not to be persuaded on this point.  Newman finally laid the 
matter to rest, declaring that “Anderson, S.C. and the Anderson Chamber of Commerce 
believes that Mr. Lewis is president of all the unions and I am going to believe with them.” 
Perhaps sensing that further argument would get him nowhere, Ramsay requested that Lucy 
Randolph Mason be allowed to give a presentation to the Ministerial Association.  Newman 
105 Ibid.
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refused.  It was clear that the head of the Anderson Ministerial Association was not going to 
support the CIO, no matter how persuasive the arguments presented to him.106
        Nonetheless, the CRD persevered in Anderson, although continuing to make 
little progress.  In early March of 1950, Lucy Mason made another trip to Anderson to meet 
with ministers and assess the CRD’s chances of gaining support from religious leaders.  Her 
report was not encouraging.  Over the span of a three day visit, Mason spoke with, either in 
person, or by phone, six ministers, and searched, unsuccessfully, for five others.  Of the six 
clergy that Mason met with, only one of them, the town’s Catholic priest, Father Maurice 
Daly, was very supportive.  Reverend Samuel Hardman, the rector of Grace Episcopal 
Church, “advocated my speaking to ministers when some one else brought that up – Father 
Daly,” but was “much prejudiced by his feeling about John Lewis.”  Mason described Rev. 
Ross Johnson, of St. James Methodist Church, as “generally speaking, for unions, but had 
many questions to ask which indicated he was not very well informed and accepted some of 
the opposition’s ideas.”107  
Other ministers were not as welcoming.  Rev. Samuel Wiley, of the First Presbyterian 
Church, and the former president of the Anderson Ministerial Association, who Ramsay had 
described in 1947 as “an exceptionally fine fellow in a large and important congregation,”108 
told Mason that “as he and Mr. Ramsay had seen each other, he did not see that anything 
would be accomplished by his seeing me.”  Mason received a similar rebuff from Rev. Alton 
106 Ibid.
107 “Anderson, S.C., Memorandum by Lucy R. Mason on Her Visit There March 1-3, 1950,” Folder 155, Box 
1568, John Ramsay Papers.
108 John Ramsay to Franz Daniel, March 20, 1947, Folder 151, Box 1568, John Ramsay Papers.
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Clark, of Holy Trinity Evangelical Lutheran Church.  Mason reported that “he was polite and 
said nice things about J. Ramsay, but it was obvious he did not want to see me.”  Perhaps 
wisely, Mason did not bother attempting to meet with Rev. Newman, who had already 
expressed his hostility towards the CIO to Ramsay the previous year.109
A Religion and Labor Fellowship never did get off the ground in Anderson.  After 
three years of work in the community, the CRD had very little to show for its efforts – the 
firm support of the Catholic priest, Father Daly, a handful of clergy, such as the Reverends 
Hardman and Johnson who, although not opposed to the CIO as such, were not very well 
informed and seemed ambivalent, and the active opposition of Rev. Newman, the leader of 
the town’s Ministerial Association.  Unfortunately for the CRD, the experience in Anderson 
proved to be more the rule, than the exception, for the South as a whole.  Where religious 
leaders did not actively oppose the CIO, they tended to remain neutral, perhaps willing to 
listen to an address or two, perhaps even engage in polite conversation with Ramsay or 
Mason, but unwilling to take an active role.  The net result of this was, of course, that most 
religious leaders remained silent, leaving the field to those who actively attacked the CIO. 
What allies the union did manage to attract tended to be men of little influence in their 
communities, or men whose congregations did not reflect the CIO’s target demographic.  For 
all of the CIO’s hopes that the southern experience would conform to the hopeful slogan of 
one of their pamphlets titled “Walking Together: Religion and Labor,” the walk, for the 
union at least, proved a lonely one.         
109 “Anderson, S.C., Memorandum by Lucy R. Mason on Her Visit There March 1-3, 1950,” Folder 155, Box 
1568, John Ramsay Papers.
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Chapter Five: Billy Graham and The Militant Truth: A Case Study of Misconceptions
The previous two chapters have examined, in some detail, the two major programs of 
the Community Relations Department of the Southern Organizing Committee of the CIO 
during the course of Operation Dixie.  In the course of this analysis, several major critiques 
have been advanced, mostly having to do with the CRD’s essential failure to grasp the 
realities of the southern social structure, and more particularly the role of the Church as a 
power broker with a significant stake in southern society.  The present chapter will elaborate 
on some of these themes through the use of a case study which illustrates many of the points 
previously made, while demonstrating the general methodology of the CRD in dealing with 
southern religious leaders.  
In the Fall of 1950, much to the dismay of the Community Relations staff, the 
September issue of a newspaper called the Militant Truth published a lengthy sermon by the 
Reverend Billy Graham.110  The sermon itself was innocuous enough, titled “The Home God 
Honors,” it set forth Graham’s argument that the basic problem with American society was 
the family, or rather, the typical American family’s failure to adhere to Biblical standards. 
The sermon set forth Graham’s prescription for a happy home life and warned against the 
morally corrosive rise in divorce rates.  The sermon contained nothing about organized labor, 
and indeed, nothing that would have been particularly controversial in 1950s society.111 
110 The Militant Truth, September, 1950, Folder titled “Militant Truth,” Box 269, Labor Periodicals, Southern 
Labor Archives, Special Collections, Georgia State University, Atlanta.
111 The sermon was, not surprisingly, highly sexist, but no more so than, say, contemporary sit-coms of the era.
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What shocked and worried the CRD staff was not the sermon itself, but rather the publication 
in which it was published.
The Militant Truth had been a thorn in the side of the CIO since the early 1940s. 
Along with similar publications, such as the Gospel Trumpet, the Militant Truth attacked the 
CIO relentlessly, using a combination of rabid anti-communism, racial and ethnic slurs, and 
religious rhetoric.  There was a great deal of evidence that the papers were subsidized by 
industrialists seeking to prevent unionization in the South, and the newspapers were routinely 
distributed to workers during the run-up to a union election.  The National Labor Relations 
Board had ruled that mailing these newspapers to their employees constituted an unfair labor 
practice on the part of employers, but distribution continued nevertheless, and the 
publications continued to plague the organizing efforts of the CIO.  Whether these 
publications actually contributed to the CIO losing elections is an open question112, but it is 
certainly the case that CIO officials perceived them to be a threat and blamed them for lost 
elections.
What was particularly troubling to the CRD about the publication of the Graham 
sermon was the possibility that workers, upon reading the article, would perceive its presence 
in the newspaper as an endorsement, by Graham, of the contents and editorial perspective 
contained in the rest of the newspaper.  Billy Graham, although still a young man at the time 
112 On the one hand, the newspapers’ attacks on the CIO were certainly vicious and, if believed, would have 
significantly damaged the organization in the eyes of workers.  On the other hand, had organizers done their 
work sufficiently well that workers were already firm supporters of the union, it is unlikely that the reports 
would have been believed or taken seriously.  On balance, it is likely that these newspapers had their greatest 
impact where workers were already pre-disposed to be against the union, or where they were uncertain as to 
their loyalties.
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of this incident, was a rising star on the American religious scene, and had gained a great 
deal of notoriety and public acclaim as a result of his Los Angeles Crusade the year before. 
During the course of the Los Angeles crusade, Graham had attracted the favorable attention 
of the media, particularly the chain of newspapers owned by William Randolph Hearst, who 
had apparently perceived a great story in Graham’s evangelism and had instructed his 
newspapers to provide favorable coverage.113  As a result, Graham was becoming a national 
figure, well liked and respected, and whose apparent endorsement of the Militant Truth could 
be expected to carry a great deal of influence among the religious workers of the South.  
The sermon, accompanied by a large photograph of Rev. Graham, and an 
advertisement for his recent book, Revival in Our Time, accounted for a total of two and a 
half pages of the eight page issue, and shared space with several other articles that attacked 
the CIO, the Textile Workers Union of America, the Federal Council of Churches, and 
communism in general.  Given the prominence of the sermon, and the accompanying 
advertisement from the Van Kampen Press for Graham’s new book, the impression that Billy 
Graham supported the views espoused by the Militant Truth was, if not unmistakable, at the 
very least a reasonable assumption.  This was precisely what the CRD feared.  
However, the case did not seem hopeless.  Billy Graham was neither an outspoken 
reactionary, nor an avowed enemy of the CIO.  Indeed, although Graham’s ministry was 
primarily oriented towards the individual’s personal relationship with God, he was known to 
have some liberal views, particularly on the subject of race.114  Although Graham was not a 
113 Drummond, Lewis, The Evangelist, Nashville: Word Publishing, 2001, pg. 10.
114 Graham’s commitment to integration would become more clear in subsequent years through his insistence on 
integrated revivals, and his clashes with the KKK and the Citizen’s Councils.  
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personal acquaintance of either Lucy Mason or John Ramsay, he was on friendly terms with 
various religious leaders, such as the Methodist Bishop Arthur Moore, who were, in turn, 
friends with Mason and Ramsay.  Thus, the CRD decided that the way to handle this incident 
was to speak with Graham directly, to determine whether he was aware of the publication, 
and, if possible, secure a denial of involvement and a condemnation of the newspaper and its 
agenda.
To this end, Lucy Randolph Mason spent a good deal of time over the next year 
trying to talk to Graham.  At first, the signs were promising.  On October 23, 1950, Mason 
had a telephone conversation with Graham, in which the evangelist told her that he had never 
heard of the Militant Truth, “and had no idea that a paper of that kind had printed his 
sermon.”  Mason reported that Graham had told her that “he is for labor and some of his 
friends say he is too pro-labor.”  Summing up the encounter, Mason wrote that “I got an 
impression of great sincerity from Mr. G. and am sure he would not want anything done in 
his name that would hurt organized labor.”  During this same conversation, Mason set up an 
interview with Graham for later that week, presumably in order to discuss a statement which 
Mason wished Graham to put out concerning the publication of his sermon.115  
While the ideal scenario, for the CRD, was one in which Graham publicly repudiated 
the Militant Truth and came out in favor of labor, a backup plan was also in the works.  A 
number of rather unsavory groups had advertised in the Militant Truth over the years, and 
had been endorsed by the paper, including Joseph Kamp and his Constitutional Educational 
115 Lucy Randolph Mason to Paul Harding, October 24, 1950, Folder 55, Box 1559, John Ramsay Papers, 
Southern Labor Archives, Special Collections, Georgia State University, Atlanta.
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League, an organization with ties to various domestic fascist groups, and whose publications 
had been endorsed by Adolph Hitler.  Information about these connections, along with 
citations from the Militant Truth attacking Franklin Roosevelt, Jews, and the United Nations, 
had been compiled and was ready to be given to various sympathetic journalists for the 
purpose of discrediting the publication.116  However these plans were put on hold for the 
moment, until it became clear how Billy Graham would respond.  As Lucy Mason put it, 
“naturally, if we are going to get from Mr. G. a repudiation of MT, we don’t want to start a 
story that implicates him with it, or starts a big fuss just as Mr. G. comes in here for a huge 
revival.  So mum’s the word for us until after we find just what sort of statement we will get 
from Mr. G. and I think it will be satisfactory judging by what he said on the phone.”117  If, as 
is evident, Mason hoped that a statement from Rev. Graham was soon to be forthcoming, she 
was to be disappointed.
By the end of November, Lucy Mason was no closer to getting a statement from 
Graham than she had been a month before.  In a letter to Lloyd Vaughn, the South Carolina 
Director for the CIO Organizing Committee, Mason reported of Graham that “he and his 
public relations man, Beavan, gave both John Ramsay and me, but principally me, because 
John was mostly away, a complete run-around.”118  In a telephone conversation between 
Beavan and Mason on November 3rd, Rev. Graham’s spokesman had even gone so far as to 
defend the newspaper, telling Mason that “other people might consider the same paper that I 
116 “Memorandum Concerning Joseph P. Kamp,” Folder 56, Box 1559, John Ramsay Papers.  See also, 
“Militant Truth or Malicious Falsehood?” Folder 55, Box 1559.
117 Lucy Randolph Mason to Paul Harding, October 24, 1950, Folder 55, Box 1559, John Ramsay Papers.
118 Lucy Randolph Mason to Lloyd Vaughn, November 25, 1950, Folder 55, Box 1559, John Ramsay Papers.
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[Mason] call scurrilous a very good paper.”119  By early December, the situation had 
evidently deteriorated further, as Lucy Mason felt compelled to seek outside assistance in 
order to arrange a meeting with Graham.  On December 8, Mason sent letters to Bishop 
Arthur Moore and Dr. Lester Rumble in order to apprise them of the situation, and to ask 
their help in facilitating a meeting with Rev. Graham.  In the course of the letter, Mason 
noted that Graham had broken two appointments to meet with Mason, and one with John 
Ramsay.120  At the same time, Ramsay wrote to Billy Graham, regretting Graham’s inability 
to keep his engagements, both with Mason, and with himself, and warning Graham that 
“your associates continue to surround you with protection,” noting that Graham’s association 
with a publication such as Militant Truth could damage his reputation.121  Evidently, Ramsay 
believed that Graham’s staff was preventing him from meeting with representatives of the 
CIO, and seemed confident that if he could simply meet with Graham in person, the whole 
affair could be sorted out agreeably.122
Mason’s letter to Bishop Moore evidently had its desired effect.  In February of 1951, 
Mason wrote to the Bishop to thank him for contacting Graham, and to inform him that a 
meeting had occurred between Graham and Ramsay the previous week.  Evidently, a friend 
of Ramsay’s had arranged that Ramsay and Graham have a meeting in Chapel Hill, North 
119 “L.R. Mason’s Memorandum On Conversation By Phone With Jerry Beavan, Public Relations Director for 
Billy Graham, November 3, 1950,” Folder 55, Box 1559, John Ramsay Papers.
120 Lucy Randolph Mason to Bishop Arthur Moore, December 8, 1950, Folder 55, Box 1559, John Ramsay 
Papers.
121 Unfortunately for the CIO, and as Billy Graham was probably aware (if John Ramsay was not) quite the 
opposite was probably true.  In the South, at least, Graham’s association with anti-union forces would not have 
done much, if anything, to harm his reputation, while an association with the CIO, probably would have.
122 John Ramsay to Billy Graham, December 8, 1950, Folder 55, Box 1559, John Ramsay Papers.
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Carolina.  According to Mason’s account, “they met – they liked each other – they parted 
good friends.  Billy told John he was anything but anti-union…”  However, for all that the 
meeting went well, Mason’s account contains no mention of a public statement by Graham 
on the Militant Truth issue, and, indeed, no such statement was ever released.  Mason and 
Ramsay had prepared such a statement for Graham’s approval, but it was never released. 
Indeed, there is no evidence to show that the statement was ever presented to Graham, or that 
he was asked to issue it.
In any event, despite the efforts of Ramsay and Mason, Billy Graham never made a 
public statement concerning the publication of his sermon in the Militant Truth.  Despite the 
favorable impression that the minister made on the CRD staffers, nothing substantive was 
accomplished as a result of the episode, and the Militant Truth escaped unchallenged by Rev. 
Graham.  The secondary plan for addressing the Militant Truth, involving criticism by 
newspaper columnists sympathetic to the CIO, which had been put on hold by Mason and 
Ramsay out of consideration for its possible effects on Billy Graham, was, ultimately 
attempted, but results were disappointing.  As John Salmond notes, in his biography of Lucy 
Randolph Mason, “few of the journalists could use the material, however, and in any case, it 
was a poor substitute in the South for a statement from Graham himself.”123
In the end, it seems that Lucy Mason’s initial impression that she was being given the 
run-around by Billy Graham and his staff was probably correct.  Much like the other 
ministers that the CRD encountered during its work in the South, Graham was willing to 
123 Salmond, John, Miss Lucy of the CIO, The University of Georgia Press, 1988, pg. 136.
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speak with Ramsay and Mason, even sympathize with their objectives in a vague way, but 
unwilling to take any action, or engage in any controversy.  In 1950, Billy Graham was in the 
initial stages of a public career that would last for over five decades, and make him one of the 
most well-known, and respected figures in the world.  Already a national figure, Graham was 
in the process of obtaining an international reputation, one that enabled him to fill 
auditoriums around the world, and consult with presidents and statesmen on issues of 
national policy.  At the same time, in 1950, this meteoric career was just beginning to take 
off, having only really begun a year or two prior, and it would probably not be unreasonable 
to conjecture that Graham wanted to avoid involvement in any controversy which might 
tarnish his reputation, or alienate his supporters.  In 1950, and in the South, appearing as a 
public champion of labor unions, and particularly the CIO, would have placed Graham in the 
center of just such a controversy, and it is thus not surprising that Graham was leery of 
placing himself in such a position.  Whatever Graham’s own feelings on the topic of labor 
unions, and there is no real reason to think he was a staunch supporter of industrial unionism 
per se, it is certainly clear that he had no real incentive to insert himself into the contest 
between labor and employers, and potentially much to lose if he did.
While Graham’s involvement in this particular episode provides a certain interest due 
to his celebrity, the point is one that encompasses much more than Billy Graham as an 
individual.  The key point is that the same conditions that applied to Billy Graham also 
applied, more broadly, to southern clergy as a whole.  Billy Graham had nothing to gain, and 
potentially something to lose by taking the side of the CIO, and so did southern ministers as a 
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whole.  Being a minister in the South was a fairly comfortable life.  Ministers were, in terms 
of status, if not always financially, members of the civic elite, important in their 
communities, and treated with deference and respect.  Members of the religious 
establishment, that is to say, middle class, mainline Protestant clergy had very little reason to 
be discontent with the status quo of southern society.  They were already power brokers and 
important men in their towns and had little reason to attack the existing order, or to aid in an 
attack upon the very system which had benefited them so much.  There were exceptions to 
this general rule, of course, but they were few and far between, and not sufficient to really 
upset the balance.
This is not to say, of course, that these were corrupt or unprincipled men.  There is 
every reason to believe that the majority of southern clergy simply did not think there was 
any need, or justification, for their involvement in industrial relations.  As has been noted, the 
religious style of the South was intensely personal, focusing for the most part on the 
relationship between the individual and God, and largely unconcerned with larger social 
issues.  The Social Gospel message never penetrated very deeply in the South, and was 
generally viewed with suspicion by fundamentalists, who tended to associate the social 
gospel with religious modernism, that is the school of theology which questions the inerrancy 
of the Bible.124  In this context it is not surprising then to find that most southern clergy 
simply did not think that unions were any of their business.  If anything, southern clergy 
probably saw unions as a threat to the industrialization that was commonly perceived, among 
124 Drummond, The Evangelist, pp. 81-82.
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the southern middle class, as a desperately needed cure for the ills of southern poverty and 
backwardness.  The southern clergy had been among the loudest boosters of the New South 
decades before Operation Dixie, and it hardly made sense to expect them to denounce the 
fruits of their efforts in the midst of the post-war economic boom.
In targeting Billy Graham and other members of the southern religious establishment, 
the CRD was, in effect, seeking the collaboration of societal insiders in a project that 
challenged the power structure of southern society.  There are many reasons why this plan 
did not, indeed, could not, work.  Other writers, particularly Liston Pope, have noted the 
financial ties between industrialists and southern religious leaders, particularly in the textile 
regions of the southern piedmont.  The leaders of Operation Dixie liked to blame fear and 
intimidation, coming from industrialists and their political allies, for their lack of support, 
both from religious leaders, and from the population more generally.  While both of these 
explanations have an element of truth, they both fail to grasp the larger point, namely that 
there was simply no compelling reason for southern clergy to aid the CIO during Operation 
Dixie.  Some southern clergy did aid the CIO out of a sense of their religious duty to the poor 
and downtrodden, but southern religion, as it was practiced and understood by most clergy 
did not perceive any obligation to assist labor unions, and the decision to stay out of 
Operation Dixie probably caused few ethical qualms among those clergy who stayed aloof, 
or even among those who chose to actively oppose the CIO as divisive and contrary to 
Christian brotherhood.  
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On the other hand, the CRD consistently neglected outsiders, those clergy who stood, 
at the best, on the fringes of the southern religious establishment, and those who, thus, had 
the most to gain from the sort of social upheaval that would have accompanied a successful 
Operation Dixie.  While other scholars have made similar points concerning other marginal 
figures in southern society, such as African-American workers and political radicals, what 
these writers fail to recognize is that the these groups simply did not have the numerical 
strength to marshal an effective coalition.  One group that did, however—non-mainline 
evangelicals and charismatics—was never really taken seriously by the CRD, or consistently 
courted.  That these religious communities could have been made into allies is, of course, far 
from certain.  There were various obstacles here too, but strategically it at least made more 
sense than trying to win over established elites.  
There are some reasons to think that, had the CIO been willing to reach out to non-
mainline religious sects, they could have cultivated a base of support that could have proved 
quite helpful in organizing the South.  As noted in a previous chapter, there was some interest 
on the part of some of the smaller sects in promoting industrial unionism.  The Rev. Charlie 
Pratt, of the Church of God of the Union Assembly in Dalton, Georgia was an enthusiastic 
promoter of unionism in general, and the TWUA in particular, because it meshed well with 
his biblically-informed analysis of the evils of southern industry.  Unfortunately for both 
Pratt and the CIO, Pratt’s close relationship with Don West, a southern religious radical and 
suspected communist, opened the minister up to anti-communist attacks and red-baiting from 
employers and union opponents in Dalton.  The CIO ultimately decided to distance itself 
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from Rev. Pratt due to the communist issue, but the situation is indicative of the possibilities 
for alliance that existed between the CIO and sectarian churches.125  
Religion, and religious imagery had also been an important element in many other 
social protest and social reform movements throughout the South.  Of course the strong role 
played by the black churches in the Civil Rights movement springs immediately to mind, but 
religion also played an important role, as documented by Mark Fannin, in the Brotherhood of 
Timber Workers, and in the Southern Tenant Farmers Union.126  Church membership could 
also both inform workers understanding of labor issues as well as serve as an organizational 
base from which to organize, as Linda Frankel notes in her study of the 1958 Harriet-
Henderson strike in Henderson, North Carolina.  Frankel writes that “religion provided one 
important axis of solidarity for the strikers,” and that “the emergence of revivalism and the 
growth of the smaller Pentecostal sects made possible a class-based religious 
organization.127”    
For all of these reasons then, it seems clear that the problem with the CRD’s approach 
to southern religion had less to do with southern religion, as such, than with the manner in 
which the CRD dealt with it.  In a sense this is a close parallel to the problem with Operation 
Dixie as a whole.  It was not the case that southern workers could not be convinced to join 
labor unions, or think in a class-conscious manner, indeed they had demonstrated the 
capacity to do so over and over again in the years prior to Operation Dixie.  Rather, the 
125 See footnote 60.  
126 Fannin, Mark, Labor’s Promised Land.  See particularly chapters seven and eight.
127 Frankel, Linda, “Jesus Leads Us, Cooper Needs Us, the Union Feeds Us: The 1958 Harriet-Henderson 
Textile Strike,” p. 115, in Jeffrey Leiter, Michael Schulman, and Rhonda Zingraff, ed., Hanging By a Thread: 
Social Change in Southern Textiles, Cornell University ILR Press, 1991.
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problem was that the CIO went about trying to recruit southern workers in a way that could 
not possibly have succeeded.  Similarly, the CRD, probably could have succeeded in its 
mission of forming an alliance with southern religious leaders, had they recognized which set 
of leaders to target.  Instead, the CRD overlooked the very groups that it had the best chance 
of forming workable alliances with, in favor of trying to appeal to religious leaders who had 
no incentive, and no inclination, to look with favor on the cause of industrial unionism.     
What the Billy Graham episode really represents then, is the failure of imagination on 
the part of the Community Relations Department that was characteristic of their broader 
program and, indeed, characteristic of Operation Dixie as a whole.  To return to the analytic 
framework outlined in the first chapter, what the CRD did was this: rather than mobilize the 
discontented, educate them as to the situation and its possible solutions, and challenge the 
existing hierarchy and deference patterns of southern society, the CRD attempted to bypass 
this process altogether by appealing to the existing religious elite in the hope that they would 
voluntarily endorse the destruction of the very system that provided them with their elite 
status.  That Billy Graham, and the rest of the southern religious establishment was not keen 
to sign on to this program, should not surprise us in the least.               
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Chapter Six: Conclusion
As has been demonstrated in the previous several chapters, the efforts of the 
Community Relations Department of the Southern Organizing Committee, as with Operation 
Dixie as a whole, were not successful.  After years of effort, by the time of Operation Dixie’s 
close in 1953, the religious community of the South was not noticeably more pro-labor than 
it had been at the beginning of the campaign in 1946, indeed, if anything the hostility towards 
organized labor was probably increased.  Religious leaders, in significant numbers, never 
came out in favor of the CIO, and anti-labor religious attacks on the organization persisted, 
largely unaffected, until the end.  The argument presented here, advanced at some length, and 
in some detail, has been that the reasons for this failure were two-fold.  
In the first instance, the CRD went about its task with little regard for the anti-
hierarchical structure characteristic of southern religion.  By attempting to argue from 
authority, that is by appealing to the denominational statements favorable to organized labor 
promulgated at the highest levels of national church bodies, the CRD failed to recognize the 
tenuous nature of authority in the Protestant denominations that dominated the South.  Unlike 
the Catholic Church, where the pronouncements of Bishops and Popes had binding authority 
on parish priests, Southern Baptist congregations, for example, were largely independent, and 
felt no need to abide by the statements of the Southern Baptist Convention.  
Secondly, the CRD failed to recognize that there was no real advantage in aiding 
labor unions for southern clergy.  Southern ministers were integral, respected members of 
their communities, a part of the civic elite which had shaped southern society in the years 
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after the Civil War, through the industrialization of the New South, and who, by and large, 
had sanctioned the very system of economic relations that the CIO was intent on overturning. 
That these leaders were not quick to join forces with the CIO is much less surprising than is 
the fact that the CIO entertained the idea that they might.  
In seeking to court these members of the societal elite, the CRD was pursuing an 
agenda that was, frankly, quite a surprising one for a social movement.  Rather than seeking 
to achieve social change from the ground up, the CIO was, in effect, hoping to short-circuit 
the long and arduous process of mobilization and struggle by convincing those at the top to 
agree to the proposed change willingly.  In this, the campaign of the CRD was actually in 
accord with another tactic of the CIO during this period, namely the effort to convince 
employers that unionization would actually be a positive good for their factories, in that it 
would ensure labor force tranquility and increase productivity.  Neither tactic, it should be 
noted, was particularly effective in achieving unionization.  When it came right down to it, 
neither group of elites saw the need for labor unions in the South, and neither group was 
swayed by the arguments of the CIO.  The reasons for this were really quite simple; both 
groups were already at the top of the social pyramid of the South, and neither needed the CIO 
to remain in place.  Indeed, as the power elite of the South correctly perceived, the CIO, far 
from being an ally, was a potential threat to their continued power and position.  While the 
whole thrust of Operation Dixie was geared towards portraying the CIO as a non-alien, non-
disruptive force in the South, the reality was quite different.  As the leaders of the CIO 
recognized, even if they were unwilling to admit it publicly, the unionization of the South 
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would have irrevocably transformed the region, economically, socially, and politically.  The 
civic leaders of the South, not surprisingly, were fairly content with the economic system that 
they had built, and saw no reason, or advantage, in change simply because the CIO desired it.
Given, then, that the plan of action that the CIO adopted in the South was little short 
of disastrous, the question arises as to why they chose to proceed in such a manner in the first 
place.  As noted towards the start of this paper, the historian of Operation Dixie, Barbara 
Griffith, has explained the CIO’s failure during Operation Dixie as arising out of the 
inappropriate use of northern methods in the South.  One element of this explanation, that 
having to do with the use of Religion and Labor Fellowship groups, has already been 
explored somewhat in chapter three, but there is more to it than this.  In a larger sense, it 
seems as if the CIO, through the CRD, was attempting to replicate, in the South, the same 
sort of political coalition that existed in the North, only with a crucial difference.  What the 
CRD was attempting to create in the South was a reflection of the current alliances prevailing 
in the North, rather than the embryonic New Deal coalition that had coalesced during the 
1930s, the CIO’s formative period in the North.
The CIO had come to power and prominence in the North, in large part, due to its 
alliance with the Democratic Party, and particularly with the New Deal political coalition put 
together by Franklin Roosevelt.128  Seizing on the opportunity presented by the social and 
political upheaval of the Great Depression, Roosevelt had fundamentally transformed the 
Democratic Party by forging a new political coalition out of various disparate groups 
128 For an overview of the relationship between Roosevelt and the CIO during the union’s formative period in 
the 1930s, see Zieger, The CIO, chapter 2, particularly pp. 39-41.
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including the various immigrant communities of the Northeast, urban blacks, and the urban 
working class.129  This represented an enormous shift in power in the North, away from the 
northern business interests that had dominated the Republican Party, and began a process of 
political realignment that would continue for decades to come.  Through participating in this 
alliance, the Congress of Industrial Organizations was able to secure the patronage and 
protection of the Roosevelt administration, and thus was able to grow and flourish with the 
aid of the Wagner Act and the NLRB.130  By the time of Operation Dixie, the CIO had been a 
major player in national politics, and had benefited from its association with the New Deal 
for a decade.  The leaders of the various constituent unions were important figures on the 
national political scene and had become, in the North anyway, something akin to members of 
the elite in their own right.  It would have been only natural then, for them to think that a 
similar arrangement could be achieved in the South as well.
The major flaw in this conception of possibilities, however, is that the leaders of the 
CIO, perhaps out of the present-mindedness to which people, and politicians in particular, are 
often prone, neglected to remember the actual details of their rise to power.  The CIO had not 
come to its strong position of the 1940s through an alliance with the prevailing powers of the 
1930s.  Indeed, quite the contrary.  What the CIO had done, was to ally itself with outsiders 
who, although they possessed potential, were not solidly in position.  The New Deal coalition 
needed all the support it could get in the mid 1930s, and thus the support of organized labor 
was a valuable acquisition.  If Roosevelt was going to solidify his position, and cement the 
129 Kennedy, David, Freedom From Fear: The American People in Depression and War, 1929-1945, Oxford 
University Press, 2005, pp. 127-128.
130 Ibid, pp. 291-2.
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dominance of the Democratic Party in national electoral politics, he needed organized labor 
on his side, and thus he was willing to court their support with the not inconsiderable power 
of the federal government.  
In contrast, the CIO, during Operation Dixie, attempted to garner the support of the 
established societal elite of the South.  These civic leaders did not need the support of 
organized labor.  The elites of the South were firmly entrenched, with no major challengers 
in sight.  Indeed, far from needing the support of the CIO, the economic and political leaders 
of the South saw the union as a positive threat to their society, potentially disrupting the 
economic system on which their dominance was built. 
Given this situation then, the failure of Operation Dixie represents no mystery.  The 
existing social system of the South simply contained no place for organized labor.  The CIO 
made a pitch to the southern elite for their support, but this elite was not interested in 
anything the CIO had to offer.  The CIO made its pitch to the workers of the South, and the 
workers, by and large, were not convinced that the CIO had anything to offer which they 
could not get on their own with considerably less trouble.  Those few workers who were 
convinced, and wanted to join a union, were, for the most part, fired, beaten, threatened, or 
otherwise coerced by their employers to the point where no significant union presence ever 
materialized in the South.  Ultimately, the CIO simply failed to make the case for its 
existence in the South, and the campaign was a failure as a result.
What was true for Operation Dixie as a whole, was true for the Community Relations 
Department as well.  The CRD tried to persuade southern ministers that supporting unions 
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was the right, proper, the Christian thing to do, and in this they failed.  They failed, largely, 
for the same reason that Operation Dixie as a whole failed.  They attempted to create change 
without creating controversy.  Ramsay and the other staffers of the CRD appealed to a group 
of people, the clergy of the South, for help, when there was no real reason for this group to 
help them.  They appealed to a sense of duty which, by and large, was not recognized in 
southern religion.  Southern religion was not dominated by the Social Gospel; southern 
clergy, for the most part, simply did not see their role as one that involved meddling in 
industrial relations or power politics, and, in the absence of any compelling rationale for their 
involvement, most clergy were disinclined to intrude into matters which they did not feel 
related to their mission of bringing people into a closer relationship with God.
There was also, as had been brought out during the course of this analysis, a class 
element involved.  The CRD was, for the most part, extremely distrustful of the non-mainline 
Protestant denominations.  These denominations tended to be intensely personal, focused on 
an almost otherworldly style of religion that eschewed the day to day realities of the world, 
and emphasized instead the spiritual world to come.  These denominations also tended to be 
antagonistic towards organizations of any kind, and particularly organized labor.  And yet, as 
demonstrated by churches such as the Church of God of the Union Assembly, these groups 
could, if conditions were right, be powerful allies of organized labor.  Moreover, as low-
status outsiders, the members of these denominations had nothing to lose, and potentially 
much to gain, by an alliance with the CIO and the social change that the organization of the 
South would have set in motion.  It is by no means clear that such an alliance between these 
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groups and the CIO would have been possible, much less successful, but the failure of the 
CRD to pursue such an option surely represents one of the missed opportunities of Operation 
Dixie.
In sum then, the CRD, through its various enterprises, focused its attentions on groups 
that had no logical reason to support the CIO, while at the same time neglecting those groups 
that, because of their low position in the hierarchy of southern society, not to mention their 
large constituency among the very workers that the CIO was attempting to organize, might 
have become allies in the organization of the South, and wasted a good deal of time and 
effort in an enterprise that was doomed from its beginning.  That this was a tragedy of wasted 
time and talent, goes almost without saying, but that it was of a piece with the overall lack of 
vision and understanding that characterized Operation Dixie as a whole, must be 
comprehended in order to make sense of the overall failure of the CIO’s campaign to 
organize the South.
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